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Para: Will You "Waive" More Than Your Hand When Hailing a Cab?: An Aff

WILL YOU "WAIVE" MORE THAN YOUR
HAND WHEN HAILING A CAB?: AN
AFFIRMATIVE RETHINKING OF VEHICLE
PASSENGERS' RIGHTS
[We must care about the principles applied by the
[United States] Supreme Court in assessing our right to be
secure against the government because the drafters recognized
that the danger to a free society begins with a misguided or,
potentially, a malevolent government.'
I. INTRODUCrION

On a hot, humid summer afternoon, Krista Connick emerged from
her downtown Chicago office toting her purse and monogrammed
briefcase.2 She hailed a cab, hopped in the back seat, and gave the driver

her destination: "One IBM Plaza, please." The taxi pulled away from the
curb and Krista removed some work from her briefcase. As the driver
wove his way in and out of the heavy downtown traffic, Krista examined
the marketing projections she was about to present at her afternoon
meeting and paid no attention to the driver or his actions. The sound of
sirens startled her out of her contemplations. She glanced through the
cab's rear window and her speculation was quickly confirmed; her
driver began to pull over. As two Chicago police officers approached the
stopped taxi, Krista quietly hoped that this ill-timed interruption would
not take long. Her presentation started in only twenty minutes. She

listened as the officers informed the driver that, due to his erratic
driving, they suspected him of driving his cab under the influence. One
officer saw an empty alcohol bottle on the floor of the front seat. 3 The

IJames

A. Adams, The Supreme Court's lInprobable Justificationsfor Restriction of Citizens'
FourthAmendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAKE L REV. 833, 838 (1999).
2 The following hypothetical situation is based very loosely on the facts of New York v.
Belton and Wyoming v. Houghton. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The hypothetical situation presented was created by the
author of this Note and is not intended to represent an actual event. Also, Sykes v.
Greenville, currently pending in United States District Court, addresses issues surrounding
taxicab passengers' rights. See Sykes v. Greenville, No. 4:99CV127-P-B, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19637, at "1-'2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 10, 1999) (mem. op.). A police officer pulled over a
taxicab in which the defendant was riding as a passenger. Id. at "1.The police ordered the
two taxicab passengers out of the cab, handcuffed them, and forced them to lie on the
ground while the officer searched their bodies and clothing without their consent. Id.
3 At this point, the officers have the authority to conduct a search based on the Carroll
doctrine. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also infra notes 42, 45-53,105-
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police ordered the driver to exit the cab, and then asked Krista to get out.
After hastily grabbing her purse and placing it over her shoulder, she
complied with the officer's request.
The officers searched through the taxicab's entire passenger
compartment and all of the driver's belongings left within the vehicle.
During the search, the officers discovered drug paraphernalia on the
passenger's side of the front seat. The officers then placed the driver
under arrest for driving under the influence and for possession of drug
paraphernalia. 4 The first officer then reached inside the cab for Krista's
briefcase and asked for her purse. They indicated that her person was
also subject to search. She objected, but the officers insisted. She thought
to herself: "Can the officers search my person, my purse, or my
possessions left within the vehicle without probable cause to search me?"
As dusk approached that muggy summer evening, two AfricanAmerican youths named Billy and Mike hailed a different taxicab on the
South Side of Chicago, a less reputable and more dangerous part of
town. Each teenager carried a backpack. Billy and Mike slid into the
cab's back seat and gave the driver their destination, a corner about one
mile away. While the teenagers talked about their plans for the evening,
the driver began to dart through the area's streets to his passengers'
intended drop-off location. When the driver heard the police sirens, he
pulled over. The officers smelled alcohol on the driver's breath. They
informed the cab driver that they suspected him of operating the cab
under the influence, and ordered him out of the taxi.5 The officers also
ordered Billy and Mike to exit the vehicle. They complied, but Billy

53, and 160-89 and accompanying text explaining the Carroll doctrine. Such a search may
occur when the officers possess probable cause that crime-connected items are located
within the car. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. Because the driver in the hypothetical situation is
suspected of driving under the influence and the officers observed an empty alcohol bottle
which may be connected to his erratic driving, the officers may conduct a search to
determine whether the car contains items related to their reasonable suspicion that the
taxicab driver was driving while under the influence. Id.
4 After placing the driver under arrest, the officers are now empowered to conduct a search
incident to arrest under the Belton doctrine. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1987). A
Belton search occurs incident to a full custody arrest, and authorizes the police to search the
entire passenger compartment of a vehicle in the interest of officer safety. See New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
See also infra notes 41-43, 54-67, 160-61, 190-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Belton doctrine.
5 At this point, the officers can again conduct a Carroll search of the taxicab, based on the
probable cause that crime-connected items are contained within the vehicle. See Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also infra notes 42, 45-53, 105-53, and 160-89 and
accompanying text; supra note 3.
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inadvertently left his bookbag in the cab. Mike put his bag over his
shoulder and the two teenagers stood next to the vehicle.
The officers searched through the taxicab's entire passenger
compartment and all of the driver's belongings in the front part of the
cab, as well as the trunk. During the search, the officers discovered drug
paraphernalia in the front seat and arrested the driver.6 One officer
reached into the cab to obtain and search Billy's bookbag, while the other
officer asked Mike for his bag. The officers also indicated that Billy's and

Mike's persons were subject to search. They stopped and commented to
each other: "We weren't doing anything wrong. Can the officers really
do this?"
While a warrant is generally required to conduct a valid search,
police officers enjoy great latitude when conducting warrantless vehicle

searches. 7 The primary justification for this latitude is the strong societal
interest in ensuring officer safety.8 The general police power to search
persons without a warrant in the interest of officer safety stems from
Terry v. Ohio.9 Under Terry, "stop and frisk" patdowns, also known as

6 The full-custody arrest again empowers the police to conduct a Belton search of the entire

passenger compartment. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See also infra notes
41-43, 54-67,160-61,190-99 and accompanying text; supra note 4.
7See generallyWyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1998); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408
(1997). See also infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text discussing the warrant
requirement and situations in which warrants are not constitutionally required.
s Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (acknowledging that when weighing the competing
interests at stake the officer safety portion of the required balance weighs heavier than the
considerations regarding the intrusion upon the individual). See also Thomas Fusco,
Annotation, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of Motorist by Police,
Following Lawfid Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters not Related to Offense, 118 A.LR.
FED. 567, 573 (1994) (stating that Terry permits the search of an individual, provided the
officer has reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts which tend to lead a rational
person to infer that criminal activity may be occurring or imminent).
9 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that police officers may pat down an individual to search for
weapons when they reasonably suspect that a person is preparing to commit a crime). See
also Fusco, supra note 8, at 573 (asserting that Terry permits law enforcement officers to stop
persons and briefly detain them, even in the absence of probable cause, to investigate their
reasonable suspicion that the individuals are involved in criminal activity). In Terry, the
Court articulated a two part test to determine the stop's reasonableness. Terry, 392 U.S. at
20-22. First, the stop must be reasonable at its inception. Id. at 20-21. The officer must
justify the intrusion on articulable facts, not just hunches. Id. at 21. Second, the scope must
be narrowly tailored to the circumstances. Id. This two-part test has also been applied to
vehicle stops. See Chris K. Visser, Without a Warrant, ProbableCause, or ReasonableSuspicion:
Is Tere Any Meaning to the Fourth Anendnent WIhile Driving a Car?, 35 HOUs. L. REV. 1683,
1689 (1999). See also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Justice on the Run, A.B.A. J., Oct., 1999, at 38.
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"Terry stops," are permissible to ensure officer safety. 10 Vehicle drivers
may also be subjected to similar "patdowns" when operating a vehicle
lawfully stopped by law enforcement officers." Terry requires that a
"patdown" search be narrowly tied to and justified by the circumstances
authorizing it.12 Such authorizing circumstances exist and include the

10Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). Terry concerned the behavior of two individuals
whose actions led police officers to believe that they were planning a robbery. Id. at 6. The
Court noted that these searches, which later became known as "Terry stops," do not require
probable cause. Id. at 22-24. The Court considered three principles. Id. First, the nature
and extent of the state's interest, namely the prevention and detection of crime, benefit
society as a whole and thus supported the constitutionality of Terry stops. Id. at 22.
Second, officer safety provided a strong justification for permitting the "stop and frisk." Id.
at 23. Last, the resulting intrusion on individual rights, while important, was outweighed
by the first two considerations. Id. at 24. After weighing these three factors, the Court held
that patdowns were constitutional. Id. at 30-31. The warrant requirement has subsequently
been expanded from the momentary detention involved in a Terry "stop and frisk" to
permit over twenty hours of detention in a border search. SHELVIN SINGER & MARSHALL J.
HARTMAN, CONSTmJTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK 288 (1986).
In a
memorandum to Chief Justice Earl Warren while the Court contemplated Terry, Justice
William J. Brennan expressed his concerns about the Court affirming the Terry decision.
Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to Chief Justice Earl Warren on Terry v. Ohio
(Mar. 14, 1968), in 2 DAVID M. OYBRIEN, CONSTrFUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 811-12 (2d ed.
1995). Justice Brennan asserted his concern that affirming the lower court's decision in
Terry would be interpreted as the Court approving of expanding aggressive surveillance
techniques. Id. at 812. Justice Brennan also asserted that affirming the lower court's
decision would completely eliminate the requirement that the police first establish
probable cause to arrest an individual prior to the arrest. Id. Rather, Justice Brennan
worried that mere police suspicion would replace probable cause as the acceptable
standard. Id. The Court very recently determined that one basis for conducting a Terry
stop includes temporarily detaining an individual who is present in a high crime area and
flees from the police without provocation. Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). While
the individual's presence in a high crime area is not sufficient justification alone, the Court
stated that a location's characteristics are relevant in determining whether the situation
warrants further investigation. Id. at 676. In addition, the unprovoked evasion heightened
the officers' suspicion, and that behavior can be considered as another factor in
determining reasonable suspicion. Id.
11See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (stating that the driver's person may
be searched incident to a full custody arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(authorizing searches of the arrestee's person based on the probable cause generated by the
full custody arrest).
See also DANIEL E. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 119 (1997) (stating that a motorist may be stopped and patted down if the
officer possesses reasonable suspicion to do so); Visser, supranote 9, at 1689.
12 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. Although this requirement seems straightforward, courts have
experienced difficulty in applying the rule in specific cases. Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-byCase Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilenmna, 1974 SuP. CT.
REV. 127,142 (1974) (noting that police require a familiar standard to apply in the myriad of
situations they encounter on a daily basis). The impossibility of police officers effectively
balancing all of the rights in question at a particular traffic stop is evident, and thus officers
require and benefit from a set of rules which can be applied in their day-to-day encounters.
Id. See also Audrey Benison et al., WarrantlessSearches and Seizures, 87 GEO. LJ. 1124, 1135
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warrantless search of an arrestee's person, a vehicle driver's person, the
area within the driver's control, and the passenger property left within
the vehicle, if the property is capable of concealing the object of the
search. 13 The police may conduct the property search based on the
Carroll doctrine, provided the general probable cause to stop the vehicle
14
is properly supplemented by the circumstances.
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable, but
exceptions to the warrant requirement exist and appropriately include
the automobile exception as well as several other situations concerning
automobiles.1 5 The Court created the automobile exception, and then
16
expanded it to include situations that impact passengers' rights.
However, the extension of this warrant exception, to passengers' persons
and their property is based on flawed logic. 17 The flaws in the reasoning
are greatly magnified when challenging the premises that underlie the
current scheme and when focusing on taxicabs as an example. 18

(1999) (stating that the officer must possess a reasonable belief that the detainee poses a
threat to either officer safety or the safety of others to justify the patdown).
1" See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (allowing the police to search a
passenger's property left within a legally-stopped vehicle when the occupants exit,
provided that the property is capable of concealing the object(s) of the search). The Court
articulated a limit to this searching authority in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). In
Knowles, the Court made clear that merely issuing a traffic citation does not give rise to
adequate probable cause to search the vehicle or its occupants. Id. at 116-117. See also
Belton, 453 U.S. at 459,462-63 (authorizing the warrantless search of the driver's person and
his or her property within the vehicle); Clirnel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (permitting the
warrantless search of one's person incident to a full custody arrest).
14Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S 132 (1925).
15See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (stating that administrative
search patterns, namely sobriety checkpoints, are valid warrantless searches); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (extending warrantless search ability to include searches
incident to a full-custody arrest); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(stating that administrative searches conducted without a warrant to detect illegal aliens in
vehicles are constitutional); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (permitting
warrantless inventory searches when vehicles are impounded); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (establishing the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement). See also
ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND PRACrICE 225 (3d ed. 1995)
(stating that automobile searches do not require warrants in certain circumstances).
16 See infra notes 26-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the background of the
vehicle passengers' rights problem.
17 See generally infra notes 68-101 and accompanying text for an explanation of the manner
in which passengers' persons and property are implicated by the expansion of the warrant
exception.
18See generally infra notes 105-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the assumptions
that underlie the Carrolldoctrine and the pivotal role probable cause plays in the analysis.
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This Note will evaluate the current status of vehicle passengers'
rights, focusing on those of taxicab passengers.' 9 Section II of this Note
examines the creation of the vehicle exception to the warrant
requirement and analyzes the present status of vehicle passengers'
rights.20 Section III discusses several flaws in the current reasoning that
may prove to be problematic in the future if the same logic is extended
and applied to taxicabs. 21 To remedy these anticipated problems, Section
IV of this Note proposes model judicial reasoning that explains and
applies an Individualized Taxicab Passenger and Passenger Property
rule.22 The proposed rule is applicable when considering taxicab
passengers' rights. 23 Specifically, this Individualized Taxicab Passenger
and Passenger Property rule requires the presence of individualized
probable cause to legally search a taxicab passenger and his or her
property. 24 This model reasoning provides a single, uniform framework
addressing the manner in which taxicab passengers' Fourth Amendment
claims should be analyzed. 25
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE VEHICLE PASSENGERS' RIGHTS PROBLEM

Before analyzing the current state of vehicle passengers' rights under
the Fourth Amendment, one must understand the general framework
used to analyze automobile searches. 26 Section II.A traces the history of
the

automobile exception

inception.r

to the warrant

requirement

from its

Section 11.B examines the expansion of this warrant

requirement exception and notes the manner in which its broadening
impacts passengers' rights.2m

19 See infra notes 26-213 and accompanying text for analysis of the current status of vehicle
passengers' rights, as well as the unique situation presented by taxicab passengers.
2
"See infra notes 26-101 and accompanying text for a description of the background of this
issue.
21 See infra notes 105-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential future
effects of applying the current reasoning in the taxicab context.
22 See infra notes 214-35 and accompanying text for a description of the rule and its
application to the two hypothetical situations described in notes 1-7 and accompanying
text.
2
3See infra notes 214-35 and accompanying text.
24See infra notes 214-35 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 214-35 and accompanying text.
2
6See infra notes 27-101 and accompanying text for an explanation of this framework.
27 See infra notes 29-67 and accompanying text for a description of the history of the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
28 See infra notes 68-101 and accompanying text for an explanation of the impact that the
Court's expansion of the warrant requirement exception has on vehicle passengers' rights.
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A. The Creation of the Vehicle Exception to the WarrantRequirement
In a majority of circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
police from conducting a search unless they first convince a neutral
magistrate that probable cause exists to do so. 29 The police officer must

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Similar language is mirrored in state constitutions as well. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 11; MICH. CoNsT. art I, § 11. The Fourth Amendment originally
applied only to actions of the federal government, but now applies to the states also as a
result of incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV § 1
("No State shall make or abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment to
the states). See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (discussing the long-standing
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to states); LAWRENCE F. Rossow & JACQUELINE A.
STEFKOVICH, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2-3 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment's protections extend to state actions). The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require a showing of probable cause before a warrant can be issued, and even
provide a procedure for requesting a warrant over the telephone. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41
(governing federal search warrants and regulating the circumstances surrounding their
issuance, content, and execution); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (requiring probable cause); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A) (permitting warrants to be issued based on telephone or facsimile
communications). See also 725 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/108-1 (1999) (prohibiting searches
without a warrant, unless the search is conducted incident to a lawful arrest); 725 ILL
COMP. STAT. 5/108-3 (1999) (stating that a judge who issues a search warrant may do so
only upon written complaint of a person under oath which sufficiently sets forth probable
cause and which describes the place or person to be searched in detail); IND. CODE § 35-335-1 (1999) (requiring warrants, supported by oath or affirmation, to lawfully search any
place, which includes locations where property may be "secreted or hidden, including
buildings, persons, or vehicles"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.651 (1999) (describing the
circumstances and requirements for the issuance of a search warrant); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 780.654 (1999) (stating the specificity required by a valid search warrant). The Fourth
Amendment's common law roots are identifiable in the Magna Carta and are later
manifested in the Virginia Bill of Rights. See generally PAGE SMITH, THE CONSTrrUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 19 (1980); KERMIT HALL ET AL, AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 4 (2d ed. 1996). The Magna Carta, a landmark of European Constitutional
development, forbade debtors from arbitrarily seizing lands, and included a promise from
King John not to unlawfully arrest or seize the parties to the agreement. SMITH, supra at 19.
In 1215, the King agreed that "no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed.. .except by the lawful judgment of his peers
or by the law of the land." Id. The Framers of the Virginia Bill of Rights adopted this idea
five hundred sixty-one years later:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of an act
29
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generally obtain a valid search warrant for the premises before
proceeding with the search. 30 Without a warrant, the ensuing search is
illegal and the Exclusionary Rule forbids using the illegally obtained
evidence at trial.31 While the Fourth Amendment requires that searches
be reasonable, based on probable cause, and conducted pursuant to a
valid warrant, it permits warrantless searches within certain welldefined exceptions. 32 Under some circumstances, the "exigencies of the

committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offence [sic] is not particularly described and supported by evidence,
are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
Va. Bill of Rights, Provision 10, inSMITH, supra at 58.
These ideas manifested themselves in the Bill of Rights' Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, adopted in 1789. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 457 (1981); Benison, supra note 12, at 1124 (stating that every
search and seizure by an agent of the government must be reasonable).
31 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained in
searches inconsistent with the Constitution is inadmissible as evidence in state court
proceedings); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 176-79 (describing the history of the
Exclusionary Rule). Originally, the Supreme Court created the federal exclusionary rule,
which forbade the admission into evidence at a federal trial any evidence obtained illegally.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). However, the Court refused to extend this
requirement to the states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). After two-thirds of the
states refused to adopt a version of the exclusionary rule at the state level, the Supreme
Court determined that the exclusionary rule must apply in all state proceedings in state
courts as well as in the federal arena. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643; SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note
10, at 177.
32 See generally Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (noting that while the Fourth Amendment usually
requires the police to obtain a warrant before executing a valid search, Chinel presented the
first exception to the warrant requirement and Belton explained the long-standing
reasoning behind the decision); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1968) (noting basic
considerations of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and establishing police officers'
authority to "stop and frisk" individuals in certain defined circumstances). See, e.g.,
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 US. 321 (1987) (explaining that warrantless searches are permitted
when the police are legitimately on the premises, discover an item they believe is evidence
of a crime, see such evidence in plain view, and have probable cause to believe that the
item is evidence of a crime); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389 (1985) (holding that
searches of motor homes are valid, even if conducted without a search warrant, because
their ready mobility brings them under the Carroll automobile exception to the warrant
requirement); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (stating that a search of the
arrestee's person conducted incident to a full custody arrest is lawful and reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment). See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (stating
that "the Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as
are unreasonable"); Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of
WarrantlessSearch of Motor Vehicle-Suprene Court Cases, 89 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1997) (listing five
general areas in which warrantless searches are permitted: Belton searches incident to
arrest, those based on probable cause, searches justified by the need to maximize officer
safety, impound inventories, and those in which valid consent to search is given); SINGER &
HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 253 (listing the following situations as illustrations of
circumstances in which the warrant requirement does not apply: searches incident to
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situation" 33 create instances in which exceptions to the warrant
requirement are "imperative." 34
Automobiles constitute one such
exception. 3S Of the many situations which can give rise to the lawful
stop of automobiles, several justify warrantless searches.3 6 For example,

arrest, hot pursuit, plain view, open fields, and emergencies).
Also, searches of
automobiles fall into the category of situations in which warrants may not be required, due
to the presence of general probable cause to stop the vehicle. SINGER & HARTMAN, supra
note 10, at 253.
33 Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948))

(stating that in order to justify the privacy invasion caused by the warrantless search, the
circumstances must be such that conducting the search immediately and without a warrant
must be of the utmost importance). In McDonald, the Court did not find the presence of
such exigent circumstances. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456. The police conducted a warrantless
search of the house in which McDonald was renting a room, because their surveillance
indicated that he may be running a gambling operation from the house. Id. at 452-53.
These circumstances were insufficient to justify a warrantless search. Id. at 456.
-3 Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (quotingMcDonald,335 U.S. at 456) (explaining that such deviations
from constitutional mandates must be the only available course of action). See also Benison,
supra note 12, at 1150 (recognizing that exigent circumstances justify some intrusions);
Search and Seizure-Automobile Exception-Search of Passengers' Belongings, 113 HARV. L. REV.
255, 263 (1999) [hereinafter Search and Seizure] (stating the Court's unequivocal
establishment of the Carrollautomobile exception to the warrant requirement).
35 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Klein, supra note 32, at 942 (1997). See,
e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997);
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See also DEL CARMEN, supra note 15,
at 225; Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search and Seizure
During Traffic Stops, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1999) (noting that different rules govern people
in transit); DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 226 (noting that the automobile exception is
justified by five considerations).
3 See generally Adams, supra note 1, at 837 (stating that the Carrollautomobile exception to
the warrant requirement originally constituted one in three exceptions, and that number of
exceptions has now grown to over thirty). In addition to the two areas discussed in this
Note's text, warrantless vehicle searches are allowed in three other circumstances. Id. First,
impounded vehicles subject to routine inventory searches may be searched in accordance
with South Dakota v. Oppernan, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Three needs justify the inventory
search: to protect the owner's property while in police custody, to protect the police
against claims of lost or stolen property, and to protect the police from potential danger.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369 (1976). Inventory searches are constitutional, provided they are
not pretext for conducting an investigation of the vehicle. Id. Further, the searches should
be motivated by the presence of valuables in plain view. See id.; SINGER &. HARTMAN, supra
note 10, at 263-64 (discussing Opperian'scircumstances, holding, and reasoning). Second,
warrantless searches are constitutional when conducted as part of an administrative search
pattern, such as a sobriety checkpoint or border search. See Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (stating that sobriety checkpoints, established in accordance with
clear state-sanctioned guidelines, constituted a minimal, constitutionally-permitted
intrusion.); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (stating that the border
control checkpoints, established for the purpose of detecting illegal aliens in vehicles,
withstood constitutional muster because the officers routinely stopped every vehicle for
their clearly established, particular purpose); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 269-73
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the Constitution permits warrantless searches when law enforcement
officials impound a vehicle and inventory its contents, and also when the
warrantless search occurs as part of an administrative search pattern
such as a sobriety checkpoint or a search at an immigration checkpoint. 37
Each of these methods of conducting warrantless vehicle searches each
38
constitute a portion of an intricate warrantless search framework.
Carroll v. United States39 and New York v. Belton4° form the basis for two
lines of cases which resulted from expanding the warrant requirement
exception to include vehicles.41 Carroll creates the foundation for cases

(discussing border searches as an exception to the warrant requirement). Last, the driver
may voluntarily consent to a warrantless search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974); Scheneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10,

at 284-86 (describing the precise circumstances that constitute providing valid consent);
O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 803 (noting that the police may legally conduct a valid search of
persons and their property after being given the person's consent). Searching property
without either a warrant or probable cause is valid under the Fourth Amendment,
provided that voluntary, valid consent is given. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1971); Scheneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Caralyn Miller Ross, Annotation,
When Is Consent Voluntarily Given So As To Justify Search Conducted on Basis of That Consent Supreme Conrt Cases, 148 A.L.R. FED. 271 (1998). Instead of utilizing a bright-line rule,
courts must apply a "totality of the circumstances" balancing test to determine whether the
consent was valid and voluntary. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Ross, supra at 271. While the Supreme
Court has expanded the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement to include the
previously-mentioned circumstances, it refused to extend warrantless search authority to
searches incident to citation. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). Iowa permitted police
officers to search a vehicle incident to issuing a traffic citation, but the Supreme Court
determined that this did not comport with the probable cause requirement. Id. at 115,119.
The two primary justifications given to authorize searches incident to arrest, namely the
concern for officer safety and the preservation of evidence, fail to adequately support
searches in these circumstances. Id. at 118-19. In Knowles, the Court placed a rare limit on
the police's vehicle search authority. Id.; Craig M. Bradley, Protectionfor Motorists-With a
Loopiole, TRIAL, Feb. 1999, at 85 [hereinafter Bradley, Protection] (discussing the Court's
opinion in Knowles); Charles F. Williams, Red and Blue Light Specials, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at
36.
37 See Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 4% U.. 444 (1990) (explaining why sobriety
checkpoints constitute legal warrantless searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976) (establishing the constitutionality of impound inventory searches); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of border control
checkpoints).
38 See generally Adams, supra note 1.
-9 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
- 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
These two particular cases lay the foundation for two separate lines of cases concerning
police ability to search cars and their contents. New York v. Belton, 453 U.. 454 (1981);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll,the Court determined the validity of
warrantless auto searches based on the presence of the general probable cause that crimeconnected items were in the vehicle. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149, 158-59. In contrast, the officers
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which require probable cause but not a warrant. 42 Those traceable to
Belton require neither independently-generated probable cause nor a
warrant since the searches occur during a full custody arrest. 43 Both
lines of cases apply specifically to automobiles. 44
Carroll, a 1925 decision, establishes the basis for the first line of
cases. 45 In Carroll, the Supreme Court first recognized an automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. 46 Police officers gained the ability

in Belton had only probable cause generated by the arrest. Belton, 453 U.S. at 454. Thus,
subsequent cases whose searches require probable cause are founded in Carroll, and those
which occur incident to a lawful arrest trace back to Belton. See infra notes 160-213 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of the kinds of probable cause required by the two
lines of cases.
42 United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Several cases followed Carroll which relied
on its mandate that probable cause must exist to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle.
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-09 (1982) (engaging in a lengthy analysis of
Carroll and stating that Carroll'sapplicability only to vehicle searches which are supported
by probable cause forms the context within which Ross was decided); California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-81 (1991) (discussing Ross's foundation in Carroll and that the
Acevedo decision is rooted in both of these cases which permit warrantless vehicle searches,
given the presence of probable cause). See also 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 668 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that an
automobile's ready mobility creates a heightened risk that valuable evidence will be lost or
destroyed while an officer obtains a warrant); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 258
(noting that in Ross, the Court relied on Carroll as precedent); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra
note 10, at 262 (acknowledging the existence of the Carroll line of cases and providing a
circumstance in which it is applicable).
43
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). See also
DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 233 (stating that searches conducted incident to a lawful
arrest are valid, even in the absence of probable cause).
41 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
45 See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 (discussing Carroll's holding, which established the
vehicle exception to the warrant requirement); Ross, 456 U.S. at 799-800 (upholding and
expanding the Carrolldoctrine).
Carroll concerned alcohol illegally
46 United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
transported in an automobile during the Prohibition Era, in violation of the National
Prohibition Act. Id. at 134. Three federal prohibition agents "set up" George Carroll and
co-defendant John Kiro by arranging a purchase of alcohol. Id. at 134-35. The defendants
failed to appear at the pre-arranged location. Id. at 135. Three months later, the agents
stopped and searched Carroll and Kiro's Oldsmobile roadster when they spotted it on the
highway during a routine patrol. Id. They suspected that it carried illegal alcohol, and
their prior interaction with these men and this vehicle formed the requisite probable cause.
Id. at 135-36. See also LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO
APPEAL 42-43 (1947) (noting that Carroll permits a search of the immediate surroundings of
the arrested person, such as the vehicle in which the arrestee is found). Also, it is
interesting to note that the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement was created
seventeen years after Henry Ford began manufacturing an affordable automobile, the
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to search a car without a warrant, provided probable cause exists to
suspect that the car's occupants are transporting illegal goods at the time
of the search. 47 The requisite probable cause to search consists of a belief
that the vehicle is carrying contraband or evidence of a crime. 48 The
vehicle's mobility creates the requisite exigent circumstance. 49 The
Supreme Court reasoned that since a vehicle can quickly and easily be
moved from one jurisdiction to another, the police must be able to search
it without engaging in the time-consuming process of obtaining a
warrant.50 Any time lost prior to the search may result in complete loss

Model T. 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 775 (15th ed. 1992) (stating that Ford first
produced the Model T in 1908). While various European manufacturers developed the
automobile decades before Ford, Ford's innovations led to the proliferation of cars and
made owning an automobile feasible for more than just the upper class. Id. at 772-75; 1
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 727 (15th ed. 1992).
47
Carroll,267 US. at 153,158-59 (stating that officers do not need a warrant to legally search
a vehicle for concealed, illegally transported goods provided probable cause for that belief
exists). The right to search and the seizure's validity both depend on the officer's
reasonable cause for believing that the automobile contains illegal items. Id. The Court
noted that probable cause sufficient to support a legal search requires more than mere good
faith. Id. at 161-62. The officer's good faith must be supplemented by factual knowledge
that makes the faith reasonable. Id. In making this decision, the Court deemed the
common law rule inapplicable in such circumstances. Id. at 156-57. At common law, a
police officer possessed the authority to arrest a person the officer reasonably believed to
have committed a felony without a warrant. Id. In contrast, an officer could effect a
warrantless arrest of someone who committed a misdemeanor only if the misdemeanor
was committed in the officer's presence. Id. The Supreme Court rejected this common law
approach, because under the common law rule the alcohol could only be seized if it were
detected from its concealed position in the car, as the auto quickly drove past the officers.
Id. at 157. Given the absurdity of such a requirement, the Court held that the common law
approach did not apply in the automobile context. Id. See generally SINGER & HARTMAN,
supra note 10, at 254 (discussing the facts and reasoning discussed in Carroll).
48 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162 (holding that the facts and circumstances known to the officers
sufficiently warranted a reasonable man to believe that the defendants transported alcohol
in the vehicle to be searched). See Klein, supra note 32, at 94Z See generally SINGER &
HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 254 (stating that the officers' actions in Carroll were justified
basesd on the ambulatory nature of the automobile).
49
Carroll,267 US. at 153. See Adams, supra note 1, at 841 (stating that Carrollsuggested that
a long-standing distinction exists between searching a store or dwelling and searching a
mode of transportation).
Adams also asserts that the Court applied the exigent
circumstances analysis to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment, relying on
the vehicle's mobility to create the exigent circumstance. Id. at 839. See also SINGER &
HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 254 (asserting that the vehicles are mobile and thus may be
searched without a warrant, while homes are stationary and thus a warrant must be
obtained before a valid house search may be conducted).
50 Carroll,267 U.S. at 153. See Adams, supra note 1, at 839 (stating that the vehicle can be
quickly moved from the jurisdiction while the police obtain a warrant and that this
possibility justifies the exception to the warrant requirement). See also SINGER & HARTMAN,
supra note 10, at 254 (stating that an automobile's ambulatory nature requires creating an
exception to the warrant requirement).
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of the ability to search the vehicle and to seize any illegal goods it may
contain.5 1 Based on this reasoning, the Court created the automobile'
exception. 52 The Court thus laid the foundation for future vehicle
searches, requiring probable cause but not a search warrant to lawfully
search a vehicle .5
In 1969, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of reasonable
warrantless searches to include those made incident to a full custody
arrest, thus creating the second area where warrantless vehicle searches
are constitutional. 54 In Chimel v. California,55 the Court held that the
person of an arrestee and the area within his immediate control could

51See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (asserting generally that to

require a warrant in such situations would unduly frustrate the function of police officers,
namely to effectively enforce the laws). Because the vehicle's mobility places it in unique
circumstances, cars are treated differently in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 153.
See Adams, supra note 1, at 835. See also SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 254 (noting
that a car may easily exit the county before law enforcement can obtain a warrant).
52Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (holding that the police may conduct warrantless searches of a
vehicle in some circumstances). See also GiUespie, supranote 35, at 2 (stating that the Court
initially fashioned the automobile exception to the warrant requirement during
Prohibition).
53Carroll,267 U.S. at 153, 159-61. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-81 (1991)
(stating that Ross and Carroll form the foundation for the Acevedo decision); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-09 (1982) (stating that Ross is founded in the Carrolldoctrine).
54See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that warrantless searches of the area
immediate within an arrestee/driver's control, namely the entire passenger compartment,
are constitutional); Chimel v. California, 395 US. 752, 768 (1969) (holding that the area
within an arrestee's immediate control may constitutionally be searched without a search
warrant). See also Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.REv.
1468, 1478 n.67 (1985) [hereinafter Bradley, Two Models] (stating that the Chimel decision
constitutes the definitive statement of the scope of searches incident to arrest); Robert R.
Rigg, The Objective Mind and "Search Incident to Citation," 8 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 281,287 (1999)
(discussing Chinel and searches incident to arrest).
395 U.S. 752 (1969). Chimel required the Court to determine whether searches incident to
a lawful, full-custody arrest received constitutional protections. Id. This case concerned
the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest, and the area in question was
the defendant's home. Id. at 753. After being arrested in his home for burgularizing a coin
shop, Chimel refused to consent to a search of his home. Id. The police informed him that
on the basis of his lawful arrest, they could search in the absence of a search warrant. Id. at
753-54. The officers searched the entire three-bedroom home, including the garage, attic,
and small workshop. Id. The Court disagreed with this wide search scope, and limited the
permissible search area to the area within the arrestee's immediate control at the time of the
arrest. Id. at 768. See also SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 240 (explaining the facts of
Chibnel in detail); Bradley, Two Models, supra note 54, at 1478 (discussing the events which
transpired in Chimel); Rigg, supra note 54, at 287 (explaining that the officers chose to
execute the search warrant while the defendant was in his home).
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reasonably be searched.5 6 The Court provided two justifications for this
expansion.5 7 First, a concern for officer safety compelled the Court to
permit the search of any area from which the arrestee may reasonably
obtain a weapon, namely his person and the area within his immediate
control.5 8 Second, the Court recognized the high value of preserving
evidence found in the area within the arrestee's control which could be
tainted or destroyed if not immediately discovered.5 9 Any area outside
of the arrestee's immediate control, however, was deemed impermissible
60
to search without a warrant.
In 1981, police officers gained the ability to search the driver's
person, the area within his or her control, and the car's passenger
compartment in Belton, thus establishing the doctrine permitting vehicle
searches incident to full-custody arrests. 6' In Belton, the Court applied

56 Chinel, 395 US. at 768 (holding that the permissible search area included only the

arrestee's person and the area from within which he may have reached evidence that could

have been destroyed or used to threaten the officer's safety). See also SINGER & HARTMAN,
supra note 10, at 239-41 (noting that the Court in Chibnel adopted the "wingspread rule,"
permitting the police to search only that area in which the arrestee could possibly reach by
spreading his or her arms).
57 Climnel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (implying that either reason alone would have been sufficient
to justify a search of the defendant's person and the area within his immediate control). See
also Rigg, supra note 54, at 287 (explaining the Court's reasons for its decision); Visser, supra
note 9, at 1693 (describing the Court's reliance on two justifications for its decision).
58 Chinel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (noting, however, that these two justifications do not extend to
a routine search of an entire home incident to a lawful arrest). According to the Chinel
Court, searching an entire home requires a search warrant. Id. at 763. See also SINGER &
HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 240 (stating that forbidding the officers to conduct any search
at all could place their lives in jeopardy).
59Chirnel, 395 U.S. at 763 (explaining that the preservation of any potentially destructible
evidence within Chimel's immediate control outweighs any other restriction). See also
Rigg, supranote 54, at 287.
60 Chimnel, 395 U.S. at 760. In Chinel, the police arrested the defendant in his home. Id. at
753. The arresting officers proceeded to search the entire house, not just the area in which
the arrest occurred. Id. The Supreme Court held that only the particular area in which the
police arrested Mr. Chimel could be reasonably searched without a warrant. Id. at 768.
Searching any other area of the home was improper, given the Court's justifications. Id.
See generally Rigg, supranote 54, at 287.
61 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (stating that when a police officer effects a
lawful, custodial arrest of an automobile's occupants, that officer may search the entire
passenger compartment) In addition, the search and ensuing privacy invasion was
justified by the lawful custodial arrest, not by a lack of privacy interest in the container. Id.
at 461. In Belton, the police required four passengers to exit the vehicle in which they were
riding. Id. at 455-56. After the police spotted a wrapper marked "Supergold," often used to
make marijuana cigarettes, the officer conducted a search of the interior of the car and
discovered marijuana. Id. at 456. He also found cocaine in one of the pockets of a leather
jacket within the vehicle. Id. See also Klein, supra note 32; Visser, supra note 9, at 1694
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and extended the logic behind its reasoning in Chimel.62 Since the search
in Belton occurred incident to a full custody arrest, officers were
empowered to conduct searches in the absence of either a warrant or
general probable cause unrelated to the arrest.63 The Court expanded the
area in the driver's immediate control, specifically the entire passenger
compartment, to include any open or closed containers within the car.64
The lawful custodial arrest independently creates the probable cause to
search the vehicle, and justifies the vehicle search as well as any privacy
infringement that may ensue in the interest of protecting the officer's
safety. 65 Together, Chimel and Belton resulted in the police's ability to
search the driver's person, the car's passenger compartment, and its
66
contents when conducting a full custody arrest during a traffic stop.

Chimel and Belton form the foundation for later cases that require neither
a warrant nor independently-generated probable cause to conduct a

legal vehicle search, commonly known as the Belton doctrine. 67
B. The Expansion of the Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Impact Upon
Passengers' Rights
The Supreme Court expanded the Carroll automobile exception to
the warrant requirement to affect certain aspects of passengers' rights.6 8

(explaining that the Court's holding that the police can permissibly search the entire
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arresting its occupants).
6 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Belton, 453 U.S. at 457-61. See SINGER &
HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 256 (stating that the Belton Court applied the Chinel doctrine to
automobiles).
63 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 233.
6In
describing why it opted to expand the search ability of police officers, the Court
explained that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment
of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an
arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].'" Belton, 453 U.S. at
460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). See also J.Tim Thomas, Belton Is
Not Welcome: Idaho's Rejection and Subsequent Adoption of the Belton Rule in State v.
Charpentier, 35 IDAHo L. REV. 125, 134 (1999) (asserting that the area of the passenger
compartment includes any containers within the vehicle, open or closed, locked or
unlocked).
65 Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63. See generally Visser, supra note 9, at 1694-95 (noting that the
need
to secure weapons and evidence justified the search).
66
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also Visser,
supra note 9, at 1693-95 (discussing Belton Court's reliance on the holdings in Chimnel and
Belton).
67
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 421 (1981).
6See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 US. 106 (1977). See also SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at
224 (stating that traffic arrests constitute one of the areas into which the Terry reasoning
was expanded).
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Pennsylvania v. Mimins 69 formed the foundation for later decisions
implicating passengers' rights. 70 Mimins, a 1977 decision, addressed
whether police officers could compel the driver of a vehicle to exit the
car when the officers possessed probable cause to pull the car over. 71
The Court explained that a constant concern with the reasonableness,
under all circumstances, of the government intrusion into a citizen's
personal security constructs the framework for its Fourth Amendment
analyses.72 The Court pronounced that the appropriate balancing test
weighs the public interest in officer safety against the individual's right
to be free from arbitrary police interference. 73
The public interest involved in Mimrns, officer safety, greatly
outweighed the private interest.74 The other side of the balancing test
required the Court to consider the individual's rights being
jeopardized.75 Because the vehicle had already been lawfully stopped in
this situation, simply requesting that the driver exit the car constituted a

- 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
70 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
411-12 (1997). See Visser, supra note 9, at 1691-9Z
1 Mimns, 434 U.S. at 109. Mimins concerned a driver lawfully detained due to his expired
license plate. Id. at 107. After the driver exited the vehicle the two officers noticed a bulge
in his jacket. Id. The search which ensued resulted in the seizure of a .38 caliber gun from
Mr. Mimms' possession. Id. Mimins is seen as an example of the police naturally
attempting to stretch the Terry stop and frisk test to its limits. SINGER & HARTMAN, supra
-note 10, at 224-25 (asserting that the Court relied heavily on Terry when deciding to expand
the stop and frisk test in Mimns). See also O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 835 (noting that the
bulge in the driver's pocket led the officer to conduct the patdown); DEL CARMEN, supra
note 15, at 120 (noting that Mimns permits the police to order the driver out of the car
following a routine traffic stop, even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the
driver threatens officer safety). See also Visser, supra note 9, at 1691 (noting that after a
legitimate stop, the officer may conduct a protective search of the driver).
72Minins, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
73Mirns, 434 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)). See
Bradley, Protection, supranote 36, at 85 (discussing the balancing test employed).
74Mimns, 434 U.S. at 110-11 (noting that "it [was] 'too plain for argument' that th[e] state's
proffered justification-officer safety-is both 'legitimate and weighty'"). The Court noted
that merely standing next to the driver's door, in the path of oncoming traffic, placed the
officer at an "appreciable" risk of danger). Id. The Court also emphasized the importance
of preserving officer safety in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See also Bradley,
Protection, supra note 36, at 85 (discussing that the danger to the officer easily outweighed
the minimal intrusion to the driver); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 225 (stating that
extending the Terry stop and frisk doctrine to a vehicle as well as one's person protects the
officer from what could be a very grave threat to his or her safety); Visser, supra note 9, at
1691-92 (" [Tihe justification for the driver search is to protect the officer.").
75Mimns, 434 U.S. at 111; SINGER & HARTMAN, sutpra note 10, at 224 (noting that intrusion
upon an individual's rights constitutes one side of the balance considered by the Court).
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slight interference at the most.76 The Court thus recognized for the first
time that asking the driver to exit the car did constitute a brief invasion
into the driver's personal liberty, but that this minimal intrusion was
acceptable, given the circumstances.77 The concerns for officer safety
outweighed the minimal intrusion into the driver's individual rights,
thus justifying the police request.78
In the 1997 case Maryland v. Wilson,7 the Supreme Court applied the
Mimms logic and extended police officers' authority to include demands
that passengers exit a vehicle. 80 The Court directly implicated
passengers' rights for the first time.8 ' The Court held that an officer
making a traffic stop could order the passengers to exit the car, pending
completion of the stop.82 The Mimms Court held that the police possess
the authority to order people, namely drivers, out of a car; Wilson
extended that ability to vehicle passengers.83 The authority to make the

76 Mirnrns, 434 U.S. at 111 (categorizing the request as a "mere inconvenience"). See also
Visser, supra note 9, at 1691-92 (stating that the protective search is reasonable).
77 Minns, 434 U.S. at 111 (calling the intrusion "de minimis"). See also MICHELE G.
HERMANN, SEARCH AND SEIZURE CHECKLISTS, 3E, 10E, 1OF (1992 ed.) (excerpting Mitnmns as
a leading case permitting some restrictions on freedom of movement and also as
supporting the police's authority to take reasonable actions to protect themselves after
lawfully stopping a motor vehicle).
7Mimnns, 434 U.S. at 111; SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 224 (stating that in Minmns,
the Court stressed the minimal intrusion upon the driver and the protection this holding
afforded police officers).
519 U.S. 408 (1997).
8
0 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410-11 (1997). In Wilson, the police pulled over the car
in which passenger Mr. Wilson traveled, because the driver exceeded the speed limit. Id.
Wilson's apparent nervousness made the officers suspicious, and Officer Hughes ordered
Wilson out of the car. Id. at 411. Upon exiting the car, cocaine fell to the ground. Id. The
officers charged him with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. This case
concerned his motion to suppress the cocaine as evidence obtained illegally. Id. See also
Visser, supra note 9, at 1725 (discussing the facts of Wilson in detail and stating that in
Wilson, the Court revisited Minns and determined whether its rationale was equally
applicable when the commands were directed at the passenger instead of the driver).
81Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410,413 n.1 (holding that the Minnns rule permitting police officers to
order the driver out of a vehicle as a matter of course extends to passengers as well). See
also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 1066 (1977).
82
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 (holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers
out of the car until the stop is completed). See also J. Ketscher, ConstitutionalLaw - The
United States Suprene Court Holds That Police Officers May Order Passengers Out of a Lawjfidly
Stopped Vehicle Without Reasonable Suspicion of CriminalActivity, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV.
715, 722-23 (1998); David G. Savage, Privacy Rights Pulled Over, A.B.A. J., June 1999, at 42,
44.
83 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412. Maryland argued that this issue was decided previously in
Michigan v. Long. Id. In that case, the Court indicated that Mitnrns permitted the police to
order persons out of an automobile during a stop for traffic violations. Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1047-48 (1983). In Long, the Court took the stop and frisk doctrine further,
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passengers exit the car stemmed from the minimal nature of the
intrusion upon them.8 4 The Court again relied on officer safety to justify
its decision.85 The presence of passengers in the vehicle heightened the
jeopardy to police officer safety.8 6 Forcing the passengers to wait outside
of the car denies them access to any possible weapons that may be stored
within the car.87 The Court based its opinion in part on passengers'
equal tendency to utilize violence as a means to prevent the discovery of
another more serious crime.8 8

Additionally, the Court acknowledged that the personal liberty side
of the balancing test weighed heavier for passengers than for drivers.8 9

permitting a valid search to occur even when the police do not observe a bulge in a driver's
jacket. Id.; SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 225. However, the search authorized by
Long should be limited to areas in the passenger compartment where a weapon may be
found or hidden. DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 121. The Court used the opportunity
presented in Wilson to uphold Mimnmns, enunciate a bright-line test, and decide the issue
clearly. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412-15. The Court acknowledged that it usually eschews brightline tests in the Fourth Amendment context. Id. at 413, n.1. However, it stated that Minints
drew a bright line, and that the principles applied in that decision apply to passengers as
well. Id. The bright-line rule enunciated in Wilson permitted officers to order passengers to
exit the car pending completion of the traffic stop. Id. at 415. See also Ketscher, supranote
82, at 721-22 (discussing the Court's holding in Wilson).
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15 (observing that since the passengers were already being
detained, ordering them out of the car changes their circumstances very little as a practical
matter). See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 722-24 (discussing the minimal nature of the
intrusion the request places on the passenger and explaining that ordering the passengers
out constitutes a mere byproduct of the stop); Visser, supra note 9, at 1726 (reiterating the
Court's language explaining that the additional intrusion upon the passenger in this case is

minimal).
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413 (noting that officers were assaulted five thousand six hundred
seventy two times during traffic stops in 1994, and that eleven stops resulted in officer
death). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) for a discussion of the high
value the Court places on officer safety in another context; Visser, supra note 9, at 1725-26
(discussing the balancing test the Court used in making its decision which weighed officer
safety against the passenger's Fourth Amendment rights).
8 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414; Ketscher, supra note 82, at 721-23 (discussing the officer safety
justification relied on by the Court)
87 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414. The Court also noted that a routine speeding violation stop
would not likely lead to a violent encounter. Id. However, the possibility of having
evidence of a more serious crime within the vehicle may lead to a more violent reaction. Id.
See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 721-23.
s8 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414. "The motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent
apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the driver." Id.
89 Id. at 413. Also, "the right of privacy is not absolute; it is relative" to the degree of the
search of the place being searched and the person conducting the search. Rossow &
STEFKOVICH, supra note 29, at 3. See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 725 (explaining that the
95

Court directly applied the Miinins balancing test to passengers, even though it
acknowledged that the passenger's interests are stronger than those of the driver).
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Probable cause gives police the authority to stop the vehicle and detain
the driver. 90 Usually, no such justification for detaining or stopping the
passengers exists. 91 Passengers are necessarily detained when the police
stop the car in which they are riding.92 The Court commented, however,
that only a minimal intrusion resulted from this temporary detainment. 93
The Court held that an officer conducting a legitimate Carroll traffic stop
may order passengers to exit the car. 94
The Court further implicated passengers' rights in its 1999 decision
Wyoming v. Houghton.95 The Houghton Court held that passengers'
property left within the vehicle falls within the permissible Carroll
warrantless search scope.96 Because probable cause to search the vehicle
existed, the police constitutionally searched the passenger property left
inside the car without a warrant.9 To make its determination, the Court
again applied the Mimms balancing test and weighed the public interest

90 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413 (discussing the definite existence of probable cause to stop the
automobile). See also Visser, supra note 9, at 1725-26.
91 Id. at 413 (acknowledging that probable cause exists to believe that the driver committed
a minor vehicular offense, but that no such probable cause exists for the passengers). See
also Visser, supra note 9, at 1726.
92
Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14 (noting that traffic stops necessarily and unavoidably detain the
passengers as well as the driver). See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 725 (discussing the
inevitable nature of the detention of passengers).
93Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14 (stating that, while probable cause to stop passengers does not
exist, asking them to exit the vehicle constitutes a minimal further intrusion). See also
Visser, supra note 9, at 1725-26 (stating that the additional intrusion upon the passengers
was minimal).
9 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 (stating the Court's holding). See also Visser, supranote 9, at 1725
(acknowledging that through the Wilson holding, the Minrns bright-line rule extended to
passengers).
- 526 U.S. 295 (1999). In Houghton, police officers pulled over Mr. Young's vehicle for
speeding and asked the two passengers, including Houghton, to exit the vehicle. Id. at 29798. After discovering drug paraphernalia on Mr. Young, the police asked Ms. Houghton
her name and she falsely identified herself. Id. at 298. She told the police that the purse left
in the car was hers only after they discovered identification within it. Id. During their
search they also found drug paraphernalia in her purse. Id. The defense unsuccessfully
challenged the admissiblity of the items found within her purse. Houghton, 526 U.S at 299.
See also Leonard N. Niehoff, The ContrabandYou Keep, 78 MICH. B.J. 720 (1999) (stating that
Hougliton's facts read like a law school examination); Savage, supranote 82, at 42 (providng
a summary of the facts in Houghton).
9 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (holding that police officers with probable cause to search a car
may examine passengers' belongings left within the car, as long as the items are capable of
concealing the object of the search). See also Adams, supra note 1, at 843 (discussing the
Court's holding in Houghton); Savage, supra note 82, at 42 (stating that the Court's decision
clearly permits a warrantless search of passenger property left within the vehicle).
97 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (holding that the existence of probable cause created a valid
warrantless search). See also Savage, supranote 82, at 42.
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against the individual rights at stake.98 The officers' justification for
searching the passenger's purse in this case rested on the probable cause
generated by the discovery of illegal contraband on the driver's person. 99
Carroll searches have long included containers within the vehicle, and
Houghton made clear that it is irrelevant whether the driver or passenger
actually owns the items in question. 10° Through Houghton, the police
gained the ability to search a passenger's property left within a lawfully
stopped vehicle when the police order the car's occupants out of the
vehicle.'01
Under the Carroll doctrine, vehicles may be searched without a
warrant provided the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime
connected item or items are within the car. 102 Belton searches, by
contrast, occur incident to a full-custody arrest and thus are supported
by both the probable cause to effectuate the arrest and the strong interest
in protecting officer safety. 0 3 To determine the extent to which the
Court may extend the logic used to determine passengers' rights, several
problems with the current analysis must be analyzed and discussed. 1°4

9 Houghton, 526 US. at 299-300 (noting that the proper inquiry involves "traditional
standards of reasonableness ... the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's
privacy and ... the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests").
Id. See also Craig M. Bradley, Whittling Away the Search WarrantRequirement, TRIAL, June,
1999 at 85 [hereinafter Bradley, Whittling Away] (discussing the probable cause generated
by the discovery of a syringe on the driver's person); Linda Greenhouse, Search of Car
Passenger'sBelongings Upheld, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 6, 1999, at A3 (stating that
the requisite probable cause existed, because of the syringe the police saw in the driver's
shirt pocket); Savage, supra note 82, at 43.
100 Honughton, 526 U.S at 300-02 The Houghton Court relied heavily on United States v. Ross.
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300-01; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982). Ross failed to
recognize a distinction based on ownership, and the Court used that rationale to further
justify its decision in Houghton. Houghton, 526 US. at 300-01; Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. See also
Savage, supra note 82, at 42 (noting that the Court rejected an individualized general
passenger property exception and explaining the three dissenting Justices' opposition to
that decision).
1o Houglhton, 526 U.S at 307. See also Savage, supranote 82 at 42 (discussing the reasoning
and potential ramifications of the Court's decision); Adams, supra note 1, at 843 (discussing
the Court's holding in Houghton); Gillespie, supra note 35, at 18 (stating that Honghton
demonstrated the Court's willingness to stretch bright-line rules).
102 See supra notes 105-213 and accompanying text for an analysis of the history of the
Carroll
doctrine.
10 3 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Belton doctrine.
104See infra notes 105-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the flaws in the Court's
current reasoning and the illogical application of the reasoning to taxicab passengers.
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FLAWS IN THE CURRENT STATUS OF

ANALYZINGVEHICLE PASSENGERS' RIGHTS

"The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and
0
disappears."1
5
"[T]he FourthAmendment protects people, not places. "16
This Section analyzes several aspects of the Supreme Court's current
foundations for analyzing warrantless vehicle searches. 107 First, it
examines two assumptions upon which the Court's Carroll doctrine
consistently relies: a failure to recognize a distinction based on
ownership to determine an item's "searchability", as well as an
assumption of cooperation between the driver and passenger to conceal
illegal items within the car.108 However, these Carroll assumptions are
inapplicable to an analysis of taxicab passengers' rights, because they do
not logically pertain to the specific taxicab context. 1° 9 Second, this
Section discusses the types of probable cause which is currently required
to validly search a vehicle passenger's property. 110 The Court presently
applies the Carroll line of cases to situations involving vehicle
passengers."' However, the analysis would likely yield a different result
if the Court were to analyze taxicab passengers' rights under the Belton
doctrine, which requires a different kind of probable cause to validate
the search: that generated by a full custody arrest.112 Deciding taxicab
passengers' rights under Belton would also maximize the privacy rights

105
Rigg, supra note 54, at 281 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62
(1971)).
106Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication, 70 VA.
L. REV.1219,1234-35 (1984).
107 See generally infra notes 107-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
foundations.
'0
See generally infra notes 113-53 and accompanying text for an analysis of these two
assumptions.
109See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text for an explanation of how these

assumptions render the Carrolldoctrine inapplicable to taxicab passengers.
110See infra notes 160-213 and accompanying text for an analysis of the role of probable
cause.
M See infra notes 162-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Carroll's current
applicability to warrantless vehicle searches.
112 See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text for an analysis of the type of probable
cause required to conduct a valid Belton search.
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implicated in warrantless vehicle searches.1 3 This search ability should
not be extended to taxicab passengers or their property.114
A. Current Reliance on Two Assumptions Which are Inapplicable to Taxicab
Passengers
The Supreme Court's present warrantless vehicle search analysis is
based on the Carroll doctrine and rests on two assumptions, neither of
which is applicable to taxicab passengers. 115 First, the Court's opinions
fail to acknowledge a distinction based on ownership when considering
whether particular items of property inside the vehicle may be
searched. 116 Second, the decisions assume that the driver and passenger
wish to cooperate to conceal illegal evidence within the vehicle. 117
Potential reliance on these two assumptions to justify searching taxicab
passengers and their property highlights a flaw in the current status of
vehicle passengers' rights.
1. Lack of Distinction Based on Property Ownership
Currently, warrantless vehicle search and seizure jurisprudence
fails to recognize a distinction based on property ownership when
considering whether property may be searched, thus treating driver
property and passenger property identically. 118 The Court's language in
Carroll focused solely on the vehicle's driver when creating the vehicle
exception to the warrant requirement and lacked consideration of the
owner of the property. 119 From the language used by the Court, it can be
inferred that the car's owner could demand the return of property
wrongfully seized from an automobile, regardless of whether that person
owned the property. 120 The driver was the only person entitled to its
See infra notes 200-13 and accompanying text for comment on the privacy concerns
implicated.
114See infra notes 113-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different reasons
the Court should create an exception for taxicab passengers and their property.
I'5 See generally infra notes 114-59 and accompanying text for a detailed description of these
two assumptions and their inapplicability to taxicab passengers.
116See generally infra notes 116-43 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Court's
reliance on this failure to distinguish.
117 See generally infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
assumption of cooperation.
113

I's See WRIGHT & MILLER,

supranote 42, at § 668.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (stating that the vehicle's owner
possesses the right to have illegally seized property, such as an automobile, returned). See
generally SINGER & HARTMAN, supranote 10, at 254; Klein, supranote 32, at 939.
120 See Carroll,267 U.S. at 156 (stating that the car's driver had the right to have the property
restored to him). See also SINGER & HARTMAN, sitpranote 10, at 254.
"19
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return, and the Court's reasoning failed to require any questioning
regarding to whom the property belonged. 121 Rather, it assumed that the
driver owned all property within the vehicle. 122
Also, the Supreme Court mentioned that if the police discover illegal
goods in a vehicle, the police should hold the car's driver responsible for
possession of the contraband within the car, regardless of whether he or
123 The
she owned it.
Court again assumed that the driver owned all of
the property within the vehicle and thus bore sole responsibility for it.124
This assumption that the driver owned all of the car's contents
demonstrates a disregard for the responsibility of the property's owner,
either the driver or a passenger. 12 5 The Court never indicated that the
owner of the illegal property could or must be arrested if neither the car
owner nor the driver owned the property. 26 While a passenger may
admit to owning the illegal property, the current analysis does not
require inquiry into the property's ownership. 27 The Court failed to
indicate whether the property's ownership bore any relation to the
person to whom the property would be returned. 128 This failure to
recognize a distinction based on ownership permeates the entire line of
cases decided under the Carroll doctrine. 129

See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 (asserting that the person in charge of the automobile could
recover the seized property).
122 See id. (failing to distinguish between multiple possible owners). See also SINGER &
HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 254.
123 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156 (stating that "the person in charge of the automobile" would
be responsible for and could be arrested due to the presence of any illegal substances, such
as liquor during Prohibition).
121

124See generally Carroll, 267 US. at 156 (utilizing "the person in charge of the automobile"

language which precluded consideration of someone other than the driver owning the
property).
125 See generally Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,110-11 (1977); Visser, supranote 9, at

1691-92 (discussing Mimins' holding that the justification for the driver search is officer

safety).
126See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
127 Id. Not requiring such an inquiry has potentially dangerous consequences. For
example, a hypothetical back seat passenger in a private vehicle could throw marijuana
cigarettes into the front seat when the police pull the car over. The police could assume
that the illegal drugs belong to the driver, even though they are the passenger's property.
The driver's knowledge of the drugs in his car is irrelevant, because he may be held
responsible for their presence in his vehicle.
121See generally id.; SINGER & HARTMAN, s$pra note 10, at 254 (discussing the Court's
holding and reasoning).
129 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (furthering the Carroll doctrine and
clearly basing its holding on Ross and Carroll); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
(building on the Carrolldoctrine and expanding it without requiring a distinction based on
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Several years later in United States v. Ross,13" the Court again
considered the constitutionality of searching a vehicle's contents,
without considering to whom the contents belonged.' 3' The Court
analyzed whether police may examine the contents of closed containers
found within a vehicle regardless of whether the driver or passenger
owned them. 132 The object of the search and the locations in which the
1 33
object may be found determined the scope of a warrantless search.
The nature of the container in which the object may be located is not
considered. 34 This method of determining the scope of a search
appropriately gives the police the authority to search closed containers
within the vehicle, but it ignores the possible relevance of the property's
ownership. 135 Similar search authority presently exists for all open and
closed containers found within a vehicle, and no inquiry into a

ownership); Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132 (1925) (creating the vehicle exception to
the warrant requirement without requiring a distinction based on ownership).
M456 U.S. 798 (1982).
131 Ross, 456 U.S. at 816-24 (holding that police officers who legitimately stop a car and
possess probable cause to believe that illegal goods are hidden within the car may search
the vehicle to the same extent as if a warrant had been issued to authorize the search). In
Ross, an informer told the police that "Bandit" sold narcotics from the trunk of his car. Id.
at 800. The informer described where the vehicle was parked, the defendant's appearance,
and the car's appearance. Id. The police arrived at the location, ordered the defendant out
of the car described by the informer, and found a bullet and a pistol within the vehicle's
passenger compartment. Id. at 801 Ross was arrested, and then the police took his keys
and searched the trunk. Id. The trunk contained a large paper bag that contained several
small bags of heroin. Id A later search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of $3,200 in
cash. Id. Ross is significant because it further defines the scope of police authority to search
vehicles, and greatly expanded the scope of permissible warrantless vehicle searches,
limiting them only by what is reasonable in consideration of the items sought. Ross, 456
U.S. at 816-24; DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 235; SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at
257-58.
132Ross,

456 U.S. at 816-24 (discussing the circumstances surrounding permissible searches
of closed containers by the police). See also Bradley, Two Models, supra note 54, at 1476
(discussing the Court's holding and reasoning in Ross); Bradley, Whittling Away, supra note
99. See also Search and Seizure, supra note 34, at 257 (discussing the Ross decision). Justice
Scalia assumed that the distinction based on ownership does not exist because such a
"substantial limitation" was not expressed, as one would have expected if the Court
wished to acknowledge such a distinction. Id. (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301).
'33 Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. See also SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 258-59 (explaining
that the Court distinguished Ross from earlier cases by asserting that the scope of a
warrantless search is defined by the object of the search and the places in which probable
cause exists to believe that it may be found).
134 Ross, 456 U.. at 824. See also Niehoff, supra note 95, at 720 (discussing that the Court's
analysis does not take into account the kind of container in question, even if that item is a
woman's purse); SINGER & HARTMAN, supra note 10, at 258-59 (explaining that the Court
distinguished Ross from earlier cases by asserting that the nature of the container is
irrelevant
to determine whether it can be searched).
3
1 5 See Ross v. United States, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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container's ownership is required when conducting a valid warrantless
136
search.
More recently, the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth
Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant prior to
searching a paper bag in a car trunk, again without acknowledging or
requiring consideration of the property's ownership. 137 The Court relied
heavily on its Ross decision. 138 The Acevedo decision focused primarily
on whether the object in the trunk could be searched, and failed to make
139
a possible distinction based on whether the driver owned the property.
Recently, the Court expressly acknowledged that a distinction based
on property ownership does not exist.14 While the Court concluded that
such a distinction is unnecessary when probable cause to search the
vehicle exists, its opinion failed to recognize the vital importance of such

136See id.; Bradley, Two Models, supra note 54, at 1476 (stating the Court's holding and

discussing the police's ability to search open and closed containers).
137
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (stating that the warrantless search of a paper
bag found in an automobile trunk was permissible, because it was based on probable cause
that the bag contained illegal drugs). See also DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 236 (stating
that the police do not need a search warrant to search a container within a vehicle, even
when they lack probable cause to search the whole car but possess probable cause to
believe that only the container itself contains contraband or evidence). In Acevedo, the
police conducted surveillance on an apartment in which they knew marijuana was present.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 566-67. Mr. Acevedo entered the apartment, exited about ten minutes
later carrying a paper bag, and put the bag in his car trunk. Id. at 567. The officers feared
the loss of the evidence and pulled Mr. Acevedo over. Id. During the warrantless search of
his car trunk the officers opened the closed paper bag and found marijuana in it. Id.
1'3 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569-81 (discussing the Court's reasons for permitting the search and
discussing Ross in particular detail). See also Gillespie, supra note 35, at 19 (discussing the
Court's reliance on Ross).
13California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). See DEL CARMEN, supranote 15, at 237 (noting
that Acevedo's significance comes from it reversal of two prior cases addressing essentially
the same issue, namely Arkansas v. Sanders and United States v. Chadwick). See also
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (stating the warrantless search of a closed
container within a vehicle was unconstitutional when the police possessed probable cause
to search the vehicle, but not the container); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(permitting the police to seize movable luggage or other closed containers but not search
them without a warrant, given an individual's heightened expectation of privacy in such
containers, despite their presence in a car).
140 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295, 301-02 (1999) (noting that neither Ross nor its
historical evidence involved or required a distinction based on ownership). See also
Gillespie, supra note 35, at 25 (stating that some critics suggest that Houghton represents a
trend where traditional police power to enforce safety laws is quickly turning into license
to freely search for drugs on the roadways); Savage, supra note 82, at 42 (discussing the
Court's holding as well as the dissent's disapproval of failing to recognize a passenger
property exception).
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a differentiation in the context of taxicabs. 141 It is imperative that the
Court create such a distinction to remedy such situations where failing to
distinguish between the driver's property and passenger's property
42
could lead to violations of taxicab passengers' constitutional rights.1
The Supreme Court's repeated and constant refusal to acknowledge the
importance of this issue illustrates one of the flaws in its considerations
of vehicle passengers' rights. 143 The Court discussed why such a
distinction lacks applicability to general vehicle passengers' rights, but
taxicab passengers' rights can only be protected by acknowledging such
a distinction. 44 Moreover, disregarding such a distinction for taxicab
145
passengers heavily infringes upon their constitutional rights.
2. Assumption of Cooperation Between Driver and Passenger
"Keep No Bad Company."'146
The current analysis of vehicle passengers rights includes an
147
assumption of cooperation between the car's driver and passengers.
The clearest example of this assumption is found in the Court's Wilson
decision. 148 In its discussion of whether the Mimms rule enabling police

MlSee Houghton, 526 U.S at 301-02. See also Niehoff, supra note 95 at 720-21 (noting that
constitutional interpretation often develops through the honing of fine distinctions, such as
the difference between a purse and a pocket, and the distinction between the purse you
hang on your shoulder and the one you toss onto the seat next to you and leave there);
Savage, supra note 82 at 42 (discussing the dissenting Justice's dissatisfaction with failing to
recognize the differing interests of passengers); Search and Seizure, supra note 34, at 255
(stating that individualized probable cause is no longer required by the Court).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Sykes v. Greenville, No.
4:99CV127-P-B, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 10, 1999) (Mem. Op.). Both
cases involve possible infringements upon taxicab passengers' rights. Woodrun, 202 F.3d at
6; Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at *2.
143 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Savage, supra note 82, at 42 (explaining
the Court's refusal to recognize a passenger property exception in Houghton).
144 See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the manner in which
taxicab passengers' rights may be implicated by failing to recognize such an ownership
distinction.
l4 See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text for an analysis of how taxicab passengers'
constitutional rights are impacted by the current analysis of vehicle passengers' rights
under the Fourth Amendment.
6 Niehoff, supra note 95, at 720 (quoting King Charles I).
147 See generally Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Emilie F. Short, Annotation,
Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found In Automobile of Which Defendant Was Not Sole
Occupant,57 A.LI 3D. 1319 (1999) (analyzing whether some or all passengers can be guilty
of possession of drugs in an automobile when the car contains several people and there is
no evidence that the drugs were discovered on the person of any of the passengers). See
also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 722-23.
14 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14. See also Ketscher, supranote 82, at 722-23.
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officers to order drivers out of their vehicles extended to passengers as
well, the Court weighed the public interest against the personal liberty at
stake. 149 In Mimms the public interest involved, officer safety, far
outweighed the driver's interest. 50 The possibility of a violent encounter
initiated by the driver justified the intrusions into the driver's personal
liberty.15' However, in Wilson the Court acknowledged that slightly
different considerations exist when passengers' rights are involved. 5 2
The personal liberty portion of the balancing test involved passengers'
private interests, and those interests are greater and require stronger
protection than the driver's interests. 5 3 The Court asserted that the
possibility of a violent encounter initiated by the passenger is just as
great if not higher, because a passenger's motivation to prevent detection
of a serious crime is just as great as the driver's motivation.' M This
crucial assumption that the passenger and driver share a common goal
underlies the Court's opinion and contributed strongly to its decision. 55
While the unquestionable need for the officer safety justification exists,
assuming a common purpose between driver and passenger overextends
the logic necessary to uphold the justification.
3. Future Problem Involving Taxicabs: Questioning the Assumptions'
Applicability to Taxicab Passengers
It is very likely that a future problem will arise concerning taxicabs
that will question the validity of the two preceding assumptions.'- 6 First,

14 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14 (discussing the balancing test employed). See also Ketscher,
supra note 82,at 725 (explaining how the Court balanced the interests at stake).
1
w Minins, 434 U.S. at 111. See also'Ketscher,supranote 82, at 725.
151See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411-12; Minrns, 434 U.S. at 111. See also supra note 85 and
accompanying text for comment on the Mimins and Wilson description of officer safety.
152 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14. See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 725 (describing the
difference in considerations when passengers' rights are at stake).
"s Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14.
See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 725 (asserting that the
passengers' interests at stake are much higher than those of drivers); SINGER & HARTMAN,
supra note 10, at 224 (reiterating this balancing test, which is rooted in the Minins decision);
Visser, supranote 9, at 1725-1726 (discussing the balancing test utilized by the Court).
"u Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414. See generally Ketscher, supra note 82, at 725; Niehoff, supra note
95, at 720 (advising that people should keep good company, and if they cannot do so, then
they should at least keep their contraband).
Im See generally Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). See also Short, supranote 147, at §2
(questioning the logic of inferring passenger wrongdoing from driver behavior).
556 Bruce G. Berner, Criminal Law Update (1999):
Synopsis of Selected Cases 9 (1999)
(unpublished Ind. Continuing Legal Education report, on file with Professor Bruce G.
Berner at Valparaiso University School of Law) (explaining the questions raised by Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion in Hougliton and Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in
Houghton). See also Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at *1-*2. That case, which is
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the ownership of the property left within the taxicab is of great
significance. 157 The Supreme Court has dismissed this highly important
distinction in the context of Carroll general car searches.' 58 However, the
need to recognize such a distinction for taxicabs is paramount. Property
clearly not belonging to a taxicab driver should not be searched without
individualized probable cause. 5 9 In order to make such a determination,
it is necessary to distinguish between the driver's property and that of
the taxicab passenger. Without making such a determination, taxicabs
passengers' rights will be unnecessarily eroded. For example, if the
police officers in Krista Connick's hypothetical situation or Billy's and
Mike's circumstances choose to proceed with the search of briefcase,
purse, or bookbags, they would be doing so based only on the probable
cause to search the driver.
Second, the assumption of cooperation between driver and
passenger is logically inapplicable in the taxicab context. Taxicab drivers
are rarely acquainted with their passengers, and most passengers lack
the motivation to engage in a scheme with the driver to assist him or her
in criminal activity. For example, neither Krista Connick, Billy, nor Mike
were acquainted with their taxicab drivers, and presumably would not
be inclined to jeopardize their interests by scheming with the drivers to
prevent the discovery of the drivers' possible criminal behavior.160
Assuming that the passenger and driver share a common goal is
illogical. Both assumptions discussed are currently relied on by the
Court when evaluating the scope of warrantless vehicle searches under
the Carroll doctrine, and neither apply to taxicabs. 161 In addition to its
reliance on the two assumptions discussed, the Carroll doctrine features a
reliance on the presence of probable cause.

currently pending, arose after the police stopped a taxicab and then proceeded to make the
passengers
lie on the ground handcuffed while the officers searched their persons. Id.
15 7 Berner, supra note 156, at 9 (explaining why such a distinction is crucial to the analysis of
taxicab passengers' rights).
158 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 306-07 (discussing the Court's opinion that a passenger property
exception is not required).
19 See infra notes 214-35 and accompanying text for discussion of the proposed

Individualized Taxicab Passenger and Passenger Property rule.
16 See generally supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text for a description of the hypothetical

and the brief nature of Krista's, Billy's, and Mike's interactions with their taxicab drivers,
thus making the passengers logically disinclined to join in a criminal scheme with their
drivers.
161See supra notes 113-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the assumptions as well
as the reasons why the current reasoning is inapplicable to taxicab passengers.
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B. The Pivotal Role of Probable Cause
While probable cause is currently required under the Carrolldoctrine
to make a valid warrantless search of drivers, the passenger
compartment, the open and closed containers within the passenger
compartment, and passenger property left within the vehicle, no such
requirement exists for searches conducted pursuant to Belton's search
incident to arrest doctrine. 162 While the Court is likely under its current
analysis to apply the Carroll doctrine to taxicab searches, the Supreme
Court should apply the Belton doctrine to warrantless searches of
taxicabs, because the assumptions which underlie the Court's analysis
under Carroll do not apply to taxicab passengers. 63 Thus, even though
each case's facts dictate which doctrine the Court should apply, analysis
under the Belton doctrine will better protect the unique interests of
taxicab passengers and will safeguard the privacy rights at stake as well.
1. The Current Analysis Relies on the Presence of Probable Cause
The current analysis used to evaluate vehicle passengers' rights
164
in warrantless automobile searches falls into the Carroll line of cases.
These require probable cause generated independently of a full custody
arrest.1s Searches fall within the Carroll automobile exception to the

162 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)

(permitting the warrantless search of the

passenger's property left within the vehicle); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
(permitting the warrantless search of open and closed containers within a vehicle); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (allowing the police to search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle without a warrant when the driver is subject to a full custody
arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (permitting the warrantless search of the
area within the arrestee's immediate control); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (empowering
police officers to conduct "patdowns"). See also Fusco, supra note 8, at 572-75; Visser, supra
note 9, at 1689. Warrantless searches are permitted under Belton only when the person is
subject to a full custody arrest. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
163See generally supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
Carroll assumptions are inapplicable to taxicab passengers.
164See snpra notes 26-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Carroll doctrine.
"6 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also David Lawrence Burnett,
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-Search and Seizure-Police Officers with Probable Cause to
Search an Autonobile May Inspect Passenger's Belongings that are Found in the Car, which are
Capable of Concealing the Object of the Search, Even Without Reasonable Belief that the Passenger
was Engaged in a Common Enterprise or that the Driver had Time to Conceal Items-WIyomning v.
Houghton, 9 SErON HALL CONST. L.J. 1173 (1999) (asserting that police officers with
probable cause to search an automobile may also inspect the passengers' belongings left
within the car that are capable of concealing the objects of the search); Respondent's Brief at
*2-*3, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (No. 98-184) (explaining that several prior
rulings, including Acevedo, Ross, and Carroll, require probable cause before a warrantless
search of a passenger's personal belongings may be conducted).
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warrant requirement if the officers base their search on general probable
cause to stop the vehicle supplemented by the officer's belief that crimeconnected items are located within the vehicle. 16 The requisite probable
cause to stop the vehicle can be generated by various traffic offenses
observed by an officer, such as exceeding the speed limit or failing to use
a turn indicator. 167 Good faith is an inadequate basis to then search,
however. 168 The Carrollline of cases has generated voluminous case law,
and the cases that follow Carroll require general probable cause that
crime connected items are in the vehicle to conduct a warrantless vehicle
search. 169 The Carroll line of cases permits searches of a driver's person,
the entire passenger compartment, any open or closed containers within
the vehicle, and any passenger property left within the vehicle. 17 In
addition, the police may order the driver and passengers out of the
vehicle. 171 A primary concern in fashioning all of these police powers is
maximizing officer safety. 172
The Supreme Court permits warrantless automobile searches,
provided probable cause exists. 173 According to the Court, an officer's
legitimate, good faith does not provide a strong enough foundation for a

6 Carroll,267 U.S. at 149 (explaining that the warrantless search must be based on probable
cause to be valid). See also DEL CARMEN, supra note 15, at 225-26 (explaining that the
existence of probable cause is key to Carroll searches).
167 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297-98 (1999) (explaining that the vehicle
was pulled over by the police because the driver was speeding and the car's lights were
faulty); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (concerning a car which was pulled over
because the driver was speeding and the car's license plate tag was missing); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (explaining that the driver was speeding); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S 106 (1977) (discussing a situation in which the driver was pulled over
because his automobile's license plate expired).
16 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161-62 (explaining that good faith is not enough to create the
requisite probable cause).
19 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (requiring probable cause to conduct
a warrantless vehicle search); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
170 See Benison, supra note 12, at 1173 (discussing the permissible scope of warrantless
vehicle searches under Carroll);see also supra note 161.
171See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15 (permitting the police to order passengers out of a lawfully
stopped vehicle); Mitnins, 434 U.S. at 111-12 (authorizing the police to order a vehicle's
driver out of the car in the interest of officer safety).
172 See supra notes 10, 74, 78, 85-88 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
premium put on preserving officer safety.
173 See Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 161-162 (1925). See also id. at 159 (noting that
the character of the offense is irrelevant in determining the validity of the seizure); Id. at
149 (stating that a valid search and seizure must be founded on probable cause); Benison,
supra note 12, at 1170-71 (discussing the Carroll automobile exception to the warrant
requirement); supranotes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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search.1 74 Rather, good faith must be supplemented by facts within the
officer's knowledge that makes the search reasonable. 1 5 When the
officer possesses probable cause, the warrantless vehicle search is
valid. 76 Probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband
was also required in Ross.'7 The reasoning in Ross directly discussed
Carroll and specifically relied on Carroll'sprobable cause requirement to
uphold the search in Ross. 78 The Ross decision also chronologically
traces several cases based on Carroll and roots the Ross decision in this
long-standing exception to the warrant requirement. 179 The requisite
probable cause to search a vehicle was established as a vital necessity in
Carroll,and the Court clearly reaffirmed this requirement in Ross.Is°
Warrantless searches were again required to be based on probable
cause in California v. Acevedo.' 81 The Court based its Acevedo holding on

174See Carroll, 297 U.S. at 161 (stating that good faith alone is inadequate to form the basis

for a legal warrantless search). Rather, the Carroll Court asserted that "reasonably
trustworthy information (is] sufficient." Id. at 162.
17 See id. at 161 (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (Pa. 1917)) (noting that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania defines probable cause as "the substance of all the
definitions is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt").
176See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
17 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See also Bradley, Whittling Away, supranote 99
(stating that, after Ross, the police may fully search a vehicle and all containers within it
provided they possess probable cause to suspect that a vehicle contains evidence of a
crime); Norma J. Briscoe, The Right to Be Free From Unreasoable Searches and the Warrantless
Searches of Closed Containersin Automobiles, 36 How. L.J. 215 (1993) (noting that the search
authority is dependent upon the presence of probable cause); Kent S. Ray, Supreme Court
Review: Fourth Amendment - Overextending the Automobile Exception to Justify the Warrantless
Search of Closed Containersin Cars: United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), 73 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1433-34 (1982) (discussing the Court's requirement that probable
cause be present to validate the search).
178Ross, 456 US. at 804-09 (reviewing the facts, holding, and reasoning, and emphasizing
the probable cause requirement). See also Ray, supra note 177, at 1433 (discussing the
similarities between the cases).
17 See Ross, 456 US. at 804-09. See also Ray, supra note 177, at 1433 (tracing the history
discussed by the Court in the Ross opinion).
180 See Ross, 456 US. at 809; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also Bradley,
Whittling Away, supra note 99; Burnett, supra note 165, at 1178 (stating that the Court eroded
Fourth Amendment rights in Ross by defining the parameters of search and seizure
requirements by the federal government's zealous war against drugs).
19 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that warrantless vehicle searches may include a paper
bag in the vehicle's trunk). See also Bradley, Whittling Awmj, supra note 99, at 85-86 (stating
that the Court held that containers found within a car could be searched without a warrant,
regardless of whether the probable cause was limited to the container or applied to the car
as a whole); Briscoe, supra note 177, at 219 (asserting that the police do not require a
warrant to search containers within a vehicle if they have probable cause to search the
vehicle).
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Carrolland Ross.182 The Court's reasoning included a lengthy review of
both Carroll and Ross, and discussed the evolution of the doctrine
requiring probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant. 183 After
discussing the Carroll line of cases, the Court extended that doctrine by
holding that searches of closed containers in vehicle trunks must be
based on the presence of general probable cause to search the vehicle. 84
Both decisions which directly implicate passengers' rights, Wilson
and Houghton, are based on Carroll's probable cause rule. 8 5 Wilson
requires the existence of probable cause to order passengers out of a
stopped vehicle.18 6
The Court also determined that searching
passengers' property left within the vehicle is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, provided probable cause exists.187 According to the
Court in Houghton, probable cause to search a vehicle is required to
search a container left within the car, even if it clearly does not belong to
the driver. 8 8

All warrantless vehicle searches decided under the Carroll
doctrine must be based on probable cause that crime connected items are
in the car. 89 Furthermore, if taxicab passengers' rights are determined
182Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569-72 (discussing both cases in detail).
183Id. at 569-72 (discussing Carroll,Ross, and the history of the warrantless vehicle search
doctrine).
'8 Id. at 580 (concluding the Court's opinion by asserting its holding). See also Benison,
supra note 12, at 1174 (discussing Ross's container search reasoning); Bradley, Whittling
Away, supra note 99, at 85-86 (noting that warrantless searches of containers are permitted
provided the searching officers have probable cause); Briscoe, supra note 177, at 225 (stating
that goods will no longer be protected from invasion by placing them in a closed container
within a vehicle); Burnett, supra note 165, at 1178 (explaining that the Court's Acevedo
decision continued to disintegrate Fourth Amendment rights by placing a higher priority
on the government's war against illegal drugs than on Fourth Amendment rights).
185 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (discussing Carroll as the foundational
case); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (basing its holding on Carroll and its
progeny). See also Burnett, supra note 165, at 1175 (stating that the Houghton Court relied on
Carroll);Ketscher, supra note 82, at 722-23 (discussing the history of the Wilson decision).
186Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15. See also Ketscher, supra note 82, at 722-23 (discussing the
holding and reasoning in Wilson).
187Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307. See also Savage, supra note 82, at 42.
188 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307. See also Burnett, supra note 165, at 1178 (noting that despite
Houghton's simplicity, the Court further eroded Fourth Amendment rights); Savage, supra
note 82, at 42. See also Search and Seizure, supranote 34, at 255 (stating that probable cause is
not required to search the belongings of those persons not individually suspected of any
crime traveling in a lawfully stopped automobile, so long as one of their traveling
companions has committed an offense justifying the search).
189See Houghlton, 526 U.S. at 307 (requiring probable cause to search passenger property left
within the vehicle); Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15 (requiring the police to have probable cause
to stop the vehicle, and permitting them to order the vehicle's passengers out of the car in
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under Carroll, it is likely that the Supreme Court would continue its
trend to expand police officers' warrantless search authority.190 The
Court would probably extend its current passenger considerations to
taxicab passengers without recognizing the inherent differences, thus
allowing the general Carroll probable cause to search the car for crime
related items to satisfy the probable cause requirement. 91
2. A Different Result May Ensue If the Carroll Probable Cause
Requirement Is Replaced By Belton's Probable Cause Generated By a
Full Custody Arrest
The current analysis clearly rests on the existence of general probable
cause to search the vehicle for crime-connected items.192 However, if this
kind of probable cause were removed from the equation and replaced by
the probable cause for a search generated by a full custody arrest, a very
different result may ensue. Belton and the cases which follow it

such circumstances); California v. Acevedo, 500 US. 565 (1991) (requiring probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of a paper bag within a vehicle's trunk); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982) (stating that the police may search open and closed containers within a
lawfully stopped vehicle without a warrant, provided probable cause exists); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (requiring probable cause to search a vehicle without a
warrant).
See United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir., 2000) (applying the logic which
110
supports the search of private automobiles to taxicabs). Woodrmn concerned a taxicab
passenger whose behavior made the police suspicious. Id. at 4-5. In accordance with a
Boston Police Department's Taxi Inspection Program (TIPS), police are empowered to
search a taxicab to maximize taxi driver's safety. Id. at 4. The Court permitted the
warrantless search of the passenger's person, and based the search authority on Ternj and
the consent doctrine. Id. at 6-14. The patdown of the passenger's person was authorized by
Terry, and the taxicab company owner's consent to participate in the program extended to
consent to search the taxicab's passengers. Id. See also Gerald L. Neuman, The
Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1637 (1999) (discussing
the Court's sporadic willingness to adapt individual rights to new threats); Search and
Seizure, supra note 34, at 255 (noting that the Court's Houghton decision continued its recent
trend toward expanding the Carroll"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement).
M9'
See, e.g., Woodnn, 202 F.3d at 14; Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at *1-*2 (describing
two situations in which the courts are infringing upon taxicab passengers' rights). See also
Bradley, Protection, sipra note 36, at 85 (stating that the Court's interest in automobiles is
not in driving them but rather in searching them); Search and Seizure, supra note 34, at 255
(noting that the Court has recently abandoned the traditional requirement of
individualized probable cause in the context of automobile travel). See also id. at 264-65
(stating that certain factors in automobile travel may justify a less stringent interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment's requirements).
92
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997);
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See also supranote 188.
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authorize warrantless vehicle searches incident to a full custody arrest. 193
The Court limits this search authority to the person under arrest and the
entire passenger compartment of the car he or she operates. 194 The Belton
search authority, based on the probable cause generated by searches
incident to full custody arrest, has not been extended to persons within
the vehicle such as passengers who are not subject to arrest.195
If considered under the Belton doctrine, it is unlikely that the police
would be empowered to search taxicab passengers or their property,
provided the passenger is not under arrest. 96 Unless the taxicab
passenger were subject to a full custody arrest, the Belton doctrine would
not authorize a search of his or her person or property. 197 Based on this
likelihood, proponents of taxicab passengers' rights should argue that
decisions pertaining to such passengers in particular should be decided
under the Belton doctrine whenever the facts permit. 198 Cases decided

193See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting warrantless vehicle searches
incident to a full custody arrest). See also Benison, supra note 12, at 1185 (discussing the
levels of probable cause required); Bradley, Whittling Away, supra note 99, at 85-86
(discussing the holding in Belton and stating that the result of this line of cases is that a
vehicle may be fully searched without a warrant based on probable cause); Thomas, supra
note 64, at 132 (discussing Belton's holding which authorized warrantless searched incident
to a full custody arrest).
191Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63 (limiting the search to the person under arrest and the area
within their immediate control, the vehicle's passenger compartment). See also Bradley,
Two Models, supra note 54, at 1478 (asserting that the entire passenger compartment is
inevitably all within reach of an arrestee); Bradley, Two Models, supra note 54, at 1498
(explaining that the Court in Belton attempted to simplify the analysis by enunciating a
bright-line rule to apply); Bradley, Whittling Away, supra note 99 at 86 (stating that the
permissible warrantless search scope includes the vehicle and the clothes of the person
subject to arrest). Cf. Search and Seizure, supra note 34, at 255 (asserting that individualized
probable cause is no longer required to conduct a warrantless search under Carroll).
19 Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (discussing only the person incident to arrest as the one whom the
police are authorized to search). See also Bradley, Whittling Away, supra note 99, at 86
(discussing the limits to the Belton doctrine); Thomas, supra note 64, at 134 (noting that the
lawful custodial arrest justifies an intrusion into the arrestee's privacy, but not that of
others not under arrest).
1%Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (allowing warrantless searches only when they occur incident to a
full custody arrest). Analyzing taxicab passengers' rights in this manner ensures that the
passengers would not be searched based only on their drivers' misconduct. See generally id.
at 461-62. See also Bradley, Protection, supra note 36, at 86 (discussing that abandoning
Belton altogether is one way to stop the Court's "shenanigans"); Thomas J. Foltz, Car Not
Always a Car; House Not Always a Home, CRIM. JusT., Spring, 1999, at 45 (discussing the
differing probable cause standards applicable to warrantless vehicle searches).
19 Belton, 453 US. at 460 (permitting a warrantless search of only those people subject to
incident to a full custody arrest).
198Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (permitting searches incident to full custody arrests). Because the
Belton doctrine authorizes warrantless searches only when they occur incident to a full
custody arrest, taxicab passengers would benefit from analyzing their rights in this fashion.
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under Belton do not require independently-generated probable cause,
because the search occurs incident to a full custody arrest, which creates
the probable cause required in the interest of protecting officer safety. 99
Thus, in order to search the person or property of taxicab passengers,
each passenger must be subject to a full custody arrest.200 Without an
arrest pending, the police would be forbidden to search taxicab
passengers' property under the search incident to arrest doctrine.20 1
3. A Comment on Possible Privacy Implications
While two features of the current analysis of vehicle passengers'
rights include a reliance on Carroll's assumptions that are inapplicable to
taxicabs and the pivotal role of probable cause, privacy concerns also
play a notable role. 20 2 The Court has repeatedly noted that individuals
possess a reduced expectation of privacy when traveling in a car. 203
Requiring a warrant protects the privacy of America's citizens better
than warrantless searches. 204 The Fourth Amendment focuses on
protecting people, not places such as vehicles. 205 Requiring a warrant

See generally id at 461-62. This type of analysis would ensure that the passengers would not
be subject to search based solely on their drivers' transgressions. See generally id. at 461-62
19 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. See also Bradley, Protection, supra note 36, at 85 (describing the
probable cause criterion); Thomas, supra note 64, at 134.
" Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Bradley, Wittling Away, supra note 99, at 85-86 (discussing the
results of the Belton line of cases); Craig Hemmens & Rolando Del Carmen, Major Criminal
Law Decisions of the United States Supreme Court: 1998-99 Term, N.J. LAw., Dec. 1999, at 29
(discussing Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Holghton, in which he asserted that the
police should be required to establish an individualized probable cause before searching
items which dearly do not belong to the driver).
2m See generally Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Thomas, supra note 64, at 134.
2 See William J. Stuntz, The Distributionof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1289 (1999) (stating that infringing on valued privacy interests is bad); supra
notes 105-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two assumptions and the role of
probable cause.
20 Burnett, supra note 165, at 1173 (stating that automobile passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy); Stuntz, supra note 202, at 1276 (discussing that the Fourth
Amendment doctrine exaggerates privacy differences by granting higher privacy
protection to car passengers than bus passengers).
21 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 445 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Bradley, Two Models, snpra note 54, at 1493 (stating that a traditional warrant requirement is
better than an oral one when protecting individual rights); Rigg, supra note 54, at 282
(asserting McDonald's comment that the right to privacy is too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those empowered with detecting criminal activity); Stuntz, supra note 202, at
1267 (discussing the nature of citizens' privacy protections).
2 Watson, 423 U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967)). See also Bradley, Whittling Away, supra note 99, at 86 (discussing the Court's
requirement that police obtain a warrant to place a bugging device on a phone booth). Katz
did not fit neatly into the Court's "indoor/outdoor" dichotomy which the Court formerly
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stems from a concern for individual privacy, not from property
concerns. 206 However, when balancing the competing interests involved
in the warrant requirement exception for vehicles, an individual's
privacy interest must be subordinate to a greater societal concern, that of
officer safety. 207 The Court has not indicated whether limits exist to this
important justification. 208
The Supreme Court currently finds the concern for officer safety
great enough to permit the warrantless search of a driver's person, the
passenger compartment of a vehicle, and passenger property left within
the vehicle. 209 Given the failure to indicate whether boundaries exist for
the officer safety justification, this reasoning may extend to taxicab
passengers and thus eliminate their privacy rights as well. 210 The
potential exists to require taxicab passengers to sacrifice their privacy

employed. Bradley, Whittling Away, supra note 99, at 86. See generally Foltz, supra note 196,
at 45 (discussing the Court's greater leeway given to automobiles when compared to
homes); Gillespie, supra note 35, at 1 (discussing the greatly diminished degree of privacy
protection vehicles receive vis-A-vis homes); Rigg, supra note 54 at 299 (discussing that
officers must be mindful of individuals' privacy rights and must justify additional
intrusions upon that right); Stuntz, supra note 202, at 1265 (stating that the Fourth
Amendment prevents the police from seeing or hearing things without sufficiently good
reason); Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Search and Seizure: Suppression of Evidetce
Found In Automobile During Routine Check of Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), 27 A.L.R.
4th 549 (1984) (stating that given the nature of a vehicle, the portions of a car not shielded
from searching eyes are not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
206 Watson, 423 U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). See also Briscoe, supra note 177, at 223-24 (discussing society's strong interest in
individuals' privacy); Rigg, supra note 54, at 299 (discussing the intense concem for
protecting individuals' privacy).
m See Gillespie, supra note 35, at 3 (stating that there is an evolving tension between state
interests and the right to individual privacy); Hemmens & Del Carmen, supra note 200, at
29 (stating that passengers' privacy rights were clearly implicated in Houghton); Stuntz,
supra note 202, at 1266 (stating that we as citizens should worry about the ways in which
privacy is defined). See supra notes 10, 74, 78, 85-88 for a discussion of various aspects of
the emphasis on officer safety.
2 See Gillespie, supra note 35 at 6 (stating that bright-line rules often promote effective law
enforcement but provide less attention to individual rights); Thomas, supra note 64, at 13543 (discussing the various ways some states have protected additional privacy rights for
their citizens than the federal law does).
2 See supra note 162.
210 See Search and Seizure, supra note 34, at 264-65 (stating that the Court's automobile
exception jirisprudence consistently fails to consider whether some situations may require
the application of different standards than others); Stuntz, supra note 202, at 1271
(discussing reduced expectations of privacy); Thomas, supra note 64, at 157 (stating that the
Court prefers enunciating a bright-line rule, even when doing so requires sacrificing
passengers' privacy rights). See Hemmens & Del Carmen, supra note 200, at 29 (asserting
that passengers possess no reasonable expectation of privacy when riding in a car
belonging to another that is being driven on the public roads).
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.interests to the greater societal interest in officer safety. 211 However,
taxicab passengers' privacy rights can be preserved to an appropriate
extent by analyzing them under the Belton doctrine when applicable. 212
Belton would authorize the warrantless search and resulting privacy
invasion when a full custody arrest of a taxicab passenger occurs. 213
Preventing a search of taxicab passengers' property under Belton would
maximize the currently minimized passengers' privacy interests. 214 To
require individualized probable cause to search taxicab passengers
incident to a full custody arrest would also ensure the preservation of the
passengers' rights without jeopardizing officer safety. 215 In an attempt to
maximally preserve taxicab passengers' rights, the next Section proposes
an Individualized Taxicab Passenger and Passenger Property rule.

See Rigg, supra note 54, at 300 (stating that officer safety has become a battle cry for those
who have declared a war on crime, and that the first casualty in this war is the Fourth
211

Amendment). Such justifications have been used to erode individual privacy rights further
and further. Id. See also Briscoe, supra note 177, at 216 (stating that some privacy rights are
sacrificed when stepping into a vehicle); Burnett, supranote 165, at 1179 (asserting that the
Honghton decision reiterates drivers' and passengers' nonexistent expectation of privacy on
the roads); Ketscher, supra note 82. at 728 (discussing the Wyoming Supreme Court's
recognition of a greater privacy interest for vehicle passengers); Robert Weisberg, Foreword:
A New Agenda for Crininal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 374-75 (mentioning
sweeping government powers that reduce individual privacy rights in the interest of
identifying criminal defendants).
212New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1925) (establishing the Belton doctrine, which requires
individualized probable cause because the search is conducted incident to a full custody
arrest). Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking,and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 265 (1998) (stating that the Court can still protect privacy if it takes
action); Rigg, snpra note 54, at 299 (requiring the police to justify intruding upon privacy
rights). See also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Belton
doctrine.
213 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting warrantless vehicle searches
incident to a full custody arrest). See also Bradley, supra note 54, at 1500-01 (praising the
benefits of easy rules for the police to follow).
211New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting searches to be conducted incident to
a full custody arrest). See also Rigg, supra note 54, at 299 (noting that individual privacy
rights are served best by requiring the officers to justify privacy invasions)J Search and
Seizure, supra note 34, at 264 (stating that under the Carrolldoctrine, the passenger's privacy
interests in her purse were insignificant, thus minimizing the passenger's privacy rights).
215New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See also Livingston, supra note 212, at 313
(stating that the police's actions can still lend coherence to the Fourth Amendment cases
where the police have intruded on privacy); Weisberg, supra note 211, at 368 (addressing
state power versus the individual).
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IV. MODEL JUDICIAL REASONING: AN INDIVIDUALIZED TAXICAB
PASSENGER AND PASSENGER PROPERTY RULE

While the Supreme Court deems it unnecessary to use an
individualized passenger and passenger property rule when analyzing
general car searches, it is imperative that such a rule be employed when
considering taxicab passengers' rights.21 6 The proposed Individualized
Taxicab Passenger and Passenger Property rule [rule] would state:
When conducting a warrantless taxicab search,
police officers who search a taxicab passenger must
either 1) possess individualized probable cause to search
that passenger or 2) the taxicab passenger must be
subject to a lawful full custody arrest. In addition,
officers must inquire into the ownership of each item
they wish to search to determine whether it belongs to
the taxicab driver or passenger.

The rule clearly features two key elements: the presence of
individualized probable cause to search a taxicab passenger's person or
property, as well as specific inquiry into an item's ownership before the
police search it.217 The individualized probable cause requirement forces
the police to focus on an individual passenger's misconduct, not the
driver's, when establishing the necessary probable cause. Because the
rule requires the police to inquire into an item's ownership before
searching it, police officers would be unable to search some items in
some circumstances. When the taxicab driver's misconduct prompts the
lawful vehicle stop, the driver's property can unquestionably be
searched. 218 However, the rule forbids the search of the taxicab
passenger's property in such a situation. His or her property can be
searched only if his or her particular actions give police probable cause

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (holding that, for general car searches
under the Carroll doctrine, a passenger's property may be searched regardless of whether
the driver or passenger owns it). In addition, the rule could be applied in two recent cases
concerning taxicab passengers' rights in order to ensure that their rights are protected as
much as possible. See United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), reh'gdenied, 208 F.3d
8 (2000); Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at "1-*2.
217 See generally Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1998), revd, 119 S. Ct. 1297
(1999). The rule is based loosely on the individualized passenger focus enunciated by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in the Houghton'slower court decision.
218 See supra notes 29-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the police's ability to
search the driver and his or her property.
216
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to search him or her. The rule, applicable only to taxicab passengers,
requires that the passenger's conduct independently create the probable
cause required, regardless of the driver's behavior.21 9 Through the rule's
requirements, it strives to strike a balance between preserving officer
safety and maximizing individual privacy rights. The rule's purpose is
not to impede law enforcement. Rather, it aims to fashion a bright-line
rule, rare in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to herald the
circumstances under which a constitutional search of a taxicab
passenger's person or belongings may occur.
Applying the rule in taxicab situations eradicates several of the
problems which could arise if the stop and possible search were
analyzed without the rule. 220 First, when the Court extended warrantless
search authority to passengers' property under Carroll,it did so based on
the driver's misconduct. 221 The rule does not rest on either of the
assumptions underlying the Carroll doctrine, because both are
inapplicable to taxicab passengers. 222
The rule acknowledges a
distinction based on ownership and actually requires inquiry into an
item's ownership before the police search it.223 In addition, the rule
recognizes that the taxicab driver and passenger do not share a common
goal to further a criminal scheme. 224 The rule thus eliminates the
assumption of cooperation inherent in the Carroll doctrine.
Second, the rule acknowledges the pivotal role probable cause plays
in the analysis of taxicab passengers' rights. It does not encourage
consideration of taxicab passengers' rights under the Carroll doctrine.
Under Carroll, the probable cause to search the driver, based on his or

219Woodnan, 202 F.3d at 4-5 (constituting an example of a situation in which the taxicab

passenger's behavior generated the probable cause required to search).
m See, e.g., id. at 5-8, 14; Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637 at *1-*2. The rule could be used
to analyze both of these cases concerning taxicab passengers. Woodinn, 202 F.3d at 4-5
(explaining the facts of the case and that Woodrum was indeed a taxicab passenger); Sykes,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637 at "1-*2.
m See supranotes 29-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Carrollline of cases;
supra notes 107-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the assumptions which
underlie the doctrine.
222
See Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at *1-*2 (describing facts in which no cooperation
between taxicab passenger and driver existed but the passengers' rights were violated
nonetheless). See generallysupra notes 105-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
two assumptions and their inapplicability to taxicab passengers.
22
3 See supra notes 116-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of such

a distinction.
2 See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of this assumption and
why it is inapplicable to taxicabs.
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her behavior, extends to all passenger property left within the vehicle.22
Analyzing taxicab passengers' rights under the Belton doctrine, however,
would yield a very different outcome. The Belton doctrine only permits
warrantless vehicle searches incident to a full custody arrest. 226 This
doctrine and the rule share similar characteristics. The rule can be
applied to an analysis of taxicab passengers' rights consistent with
Belton's requirements. In both circumstances, a particular person's
actions generate the probable cause. 227 Warrantless search authority
does not extend to anyone for whom probable cause does not exist to
search. 2 The Court's application of a particular doctrine is based on the
facts of the case; they cannot simply choose which doctrine to apply.
However, given the inapplicability of the assumptions which underlie
the Carroll doctrine to taxicab passengers, applying the Belton doctrine
best protects their rights. The rule requires the probable cause to be
specific to each individual, just as the Belton doctrine does. Passengers
who are not under arrest may not be searched incident to the arrest of
the driver.229 Thus, the rule similarly recognizes that the key to
conducting a valid warrantless search which protects taxicab passengers'
rights as much as possible lies in requiring probable cause focused on
each individual. 230
Third, requiring individualized probable cause to search a passenger
or his or her property provides greater protection for an individual's
privacy interests. 231 To a certain extent, an individual's privacy rights
must be subordinate to the societal interest in ensuring the safety of
police officers. 232 However, extending that justification to taxicab
passengers who have not engaged in any of the behaviors which

See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (permitting the search of passengers'
property left within a general vehicle). See also supra notes 160-89 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the role probable cause plays in the Carrolldoctrine.
n6 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
2See id. (permitting warranless vehicle searches when they are conducted incident to a
full custody arrest).
m25
Id. See also Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at *1-*2 (explaining that in this case, a
police officer searched two taxicab passengers' persons and clothing without either
probable cause or their consent).
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
2" Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at "1-*2 (describing a situation in which taxicab
passengers' rights were violated). This approach is uniquely suited to taxicab passengers,
however, due to the logical inapplicability of the court's assumptions to taxicab passengers.
See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
231See id. See also supranotes 200-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privacy
interests at stake.
232 See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text for an analysis of the privacy interests
involved.
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traditionally support the justification exceeds acceptable limits. 233
Passengers should not be forced to sacrifice their rights to privacy based
on their drivers' transgressions.
Applying the rule to Krista Connick's hypothetical situation and to
Billy and Mike's circumstances highlights its benefits. In their particular
situations, the reasons the Chicago Police pulled over the taxicabs are
critical to the analysis. The existence of probable cause, based on police
suspicion and the driver's erratic driving, authorizes a search of the
driver's person and the passenger compartment. Since the police
suspected the driver of driving under the influence, any indicators
confirming that suspicion, such as an alcohol bottle spotted in the cab or
the smell of alcohol, would authorize the search. Assuming that
probable cause to search Krista, Billy, or Mike does not exist, the rule
would permit the search of the driver's property, but not that of any of
the passengers.
It would also permit the search of the driver's
belongings, but not of those belonging to Krista, Billy, or Mike. Any
probable cause which exists to search the taxi driver will not extend to
the passengers. In Krista's situation, the police would be unable to
search her person, briefcase, or purse. The police would similarly be
unable to search Billy's or Mike's bookbags. The rule requires the
probable cause to be specific to the passengers, which is consistent with
the Belton doctrine. Since they are not under arrest, the police may not
conduct a search incident to arrest.234 The key to conducting a valid
warrantless search of the taxicab's passenger is the individualized
probable cause.3 s
The rule does not authorize the police to search Krista's person, her
briefcase, or her purse, nor can they search Billy or Mike's persons or
bookbags. The Court has not recognized circumstances in which the
person of a passenger, taxicab or otherwise, may be searched without a
warrant or probable cause. Therefore, their persons cannot be searched.
Assuming that the three passengers take no affirmative action to cause
the police to suspect them of any wrongdoing, the police will also be
unable to search the items left within the cab: Krista's briefcase or Billy's

See Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at 1-*2 (discussing a situation in which the
taxicab passengers were not suspected of wrongdoing but were searched nonetheless).
2m See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting searches incident to arrest).
2 See Sykes, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19637, at *1-*2 (discussing a situation in which taxicab
passengers' rights were violated).
23
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bookbag. 236 The rule requires the officers to inquire into ownership of
the briefcase and bookbag, and it only permits them to search each item
if either of them belongs to the driver. Their ownership cannot be
assumed; they are in the passenger area of a taxicab and seem to be
clearly left there by the passenger. Upon inquiry, the officers will
discover that the briefcase belongs to Krista and that the bookbag
belongs to Billy. Since they lack probable cause to search the passenger
or their belongings, neither the briefcase nor the bookbag left within the
vehicle can be searched. Because Krista's purse belongs to her and not
the driver, the rule does not authorize the police to search it either. 237
The facts of the two hypothetical situations prevent the searches of the
three passengers' persons, Krista's briefcase and purse, and the two
bookbags when analyzing the situations using the proposed
Individualized Taxicab Passenger and Passenger Property rule.
Applying the Individualized Taxicab Passenger and Passenger
Property rule focuses on the individual's conduct, not that of the driver.
The rule remedies the problems encountered when analyzing the current
state of vehicle passengers' rights by recognizing that the taxicab drivers
and passengers are not necessarily acting in concert, requiring both
individualized probable cause, and mandating a specific inquiry into an
item's ownership before the police conduct a warrantless taxicab search.
V. CONCLUSION

A distinction must be recognized between taxicab passengers and
general passengers in private vehicles. This Note examined the current
state of vehicle passengers' rights and explains several reasons that the
present analysis robs taxicab passengers of their Fourth Amendment
rights. The assumptions that underlie the Carroll doctrine do not
logically apply to taxicab passengers. A distinction between taxicab
driver, taxicab passenger, and their respective property is imperative but
has not yet been recognized as necessary by the Supreme Court. In
addition, assuming that the driver and passenger share a common goal
defies logic. Given the inapplicability of these two foundational

236 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that it
would be absurd to conduct a warrantless search of a taxicab passenger's briefcase based
only on the probable cause to believe that the driver may have contraband in the taxi).
237 See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring) (expressing his concern that a
woman's purse should be treated as a "special container," despite the fact that the purse
itself does not make a legally operative difference currently); Burnett, supra note 165, at
1177 (discussing Justice Breyer's concern that ladies' purses constitute a "special container"
that should not be automatically subjected to a warrantless search in a seized car).
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assumptions to taxicab passengers, the Court should analyze taxicab
passengers' rights under the Belton doctrine whenever possible. Thus, a
full custody arrest would be required to effectuate a search of the taxicab
passenger's person or property.
Adequately protecting taxicab
passengers' rights necessarily involves examining the privacy
implications at stake as well. While an individual's privacy interests
must succumb to the societal interest in guarding officer safety in most
circumstances, searching a taxicab passenger's property without
probable cause exceeds acceptable boundaries. The Individualized
Taxicab Passenger and Passenger Property rule proposed by this Note
remedies those problems and adequately protects the interests and rights
of taxicab passengers without placing too great a burden on law
enforcement. Applying the rule to the two hypothetical situations
highlights its benefits. As a result of its application, the officers would
be unable to search Krista's person, her purse, or her briefcase. It would
also prevent searches of Billy and Mike's persons or bookbags.
Recognizing the need for individualized probable cause ensures that
taxicab passengers will not waive more than their hands when hailing a
cab.
Marina C. Para
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